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KEEPING THE FAITH: THE PROBLEM OF APPARENT BIAS
IN LABOR REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS
John W. Teeter, Jr.*
I.

INTRODUCTION

An essential purpose of the National Labor Relations Act (the
"Act") I is to protect "the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively." 2 To fulfill this right, the Act grants workers the
freedom to choose whether or not a labor organization shall represent them for purposes of collective bargaining. When an employer
refuses voluntarily to recognize a union as its employees' chosen
representative, those employees may file a petition stating their desire to be represented by that union with the National Labor Relations Board (the "Board"). If the Board "has reasonable cause to
believe that a question of representation affecting commerce exists[,] ... it shall direct an election by secret ballot and shall certify
3
the results thereof."
This ideal of labor democracy, however, can be corrupted by a
variety of flaws in the election process. For example, employers can
resort to intimidation or unlawful promises to forestall support for
the union; unions can engage in illicit coercion; and agents of the
Board itself can engage in misconduct that indicates bias for or
against a particular side. Each of these occurrences undermines the
workers' freedom of choice and constitutes grounds for setting
aside the election and ordering a new one to be held. 4 As the Board
emphasized in General Shoe Corp., 5 it must undertake vigilant efforts
to assure the sanctity of representation elections:
In election proceedings, it is the Board's function to provide a
laboratory in which an experiment may be conducted, under
Assistant Professor, Oklahoma City University School of Law. University of
Illinois at Chicago Circle, A.B., 1982; Harvard Law School, J.D., 1985. The author
would like to thank the Kerr Foundation for its generous research grant. The author
also wishes to thank his students and colleagues for their encouragement and

inspiration.
The author was one of the attorneys representing the employer in Hudson Aviation

Services, 288 N.L.R.B. No. 94 (April 29, 1988), discussed infra at notes 223-26 and
accompanying text, but no longer practices law on behalf of labor or management.

1. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-169 (1982)).
2. Id. at § 151.

3. Id. at § 159(c)(1)(B).
4. For a thorough discussion of representation elections, see R. WILLIAMS, NLRB
REGULATION OF ELECTION CONDUCT (rev. ed. 1985).

5. 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948).
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conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibited desires of employees. It is our duty to establish those
conditions; it is also our duty to determine whether they have
been fulfilled. When, in the rare extreme case, the standard
drops too low, because of ourfault or that of others, the requisite
laboratory conditions are not present and the experiment
6
must be conducted over again.
In short, even if the employer, workers, and union all behave in a
lawful and nondisruptive manner, the Board will set aside elections
tainted by its own misconduct if the "laboratory conditions" are
spoiled. One crucial manner in which the Board can pollute its laboratory is when its agents make statements or engage in acts that
suggest a lack of impartiality in the election. Although section 151
of the Act declares the congressional policy of "encouraging the
practice and procedure of collective bargaining and ... protecting
the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing," the
Board and courts have emphasized that the choice of unionizing or
not unionizing is left entirely to the workers. As the late Justice
Douglas once explained:
Any procedure requiring a "fair" election must honor the
right of those who oppose a union as well as those who favor
it. The Act is wholly neutral when it comes to that basic
choice. By § 7 of the Act employees have the right not only to
"form, join, or assist" unions but also the right "to refrain
7
from any or all of such activities."
For that reason, Justice Douglas concluded that "[t]he Board in its
supervision of union elections may not sanction procedures that cast
their weight for the choice of a union and against a non-union shop
or for a non-union shop and against a union." 8 It therefore is plain
that the Board's role in representation elections is to ascertain the
employees' wishes concerning unionization, and not to influence
that fundamental choice.9
6. Id. at 127 (emphasis added).
7. NLRB v. Savair Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 270, 278 (1973) (quoting 29 U.S.C § 157
(1972)).
8. Id. at 280.

9. The legislative history of the Act reinforces the concept that the Board must
behave as an objective fact finder rather than a partisan in representation elections. As
Senator Robert F. Wagner explained, "[a]n election is nothing but an investigation, a
factual determination of who are the representatives of employees." The National Labor
Relations Act: Hearings on S. 1958 before the Senate Comm. on Education and Labor, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1935), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS ACT 1426 (reprint ed. 1985). Similarly, Chairman Biddle of the Board
stated: "An election is conducted by the Board for the sole purpose of ascertaining a
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In practice, however, agents of the Board occasionally violate this
requirement of neutrality through acts, communications, or procedures that suggest favoritism toward a party to the election. In this
Article I explore how the Board and federal courts have sought to
redress this problem of apparently biased conduct by Board agents
during the course of representation elections. First, I will examine
the Board's initial approach, which generally refused to invalidate
elections unless it appeared that the Board agent's misconduct actually affected the election's outcome. Second, I will analyze Athbro
Precision Engineering Corp., 10 which stated that elections could be set
aside whenever a Board agent's misconduct tended to destroy confidence in the Board's election process or could reasonably be interpreted as impugning the Board's election standards regardless of
whether such misconduct could have affected how employees voted.
Third, I will discuss the fluctuating adherence the Board and federal
courts have given to the Athbro standard. Finally, I will explain the
need for the Board and courts to apply Athbro in a clear and consistent manner.
II.

THE PRE-ATHBRO ERA

For many years the Board steadily certified representation election results despite charges that an agent conducting the election
had demonstrated bias toward either the employer or the union. In
essence, the Board's philosophy appeared to be that allegations of
Board agent bias were immateri'al unless the alleged partiality could
have influenced the election's outcome by affecting the way workers
voted. Perhaps the earliest explicit statement of this focus on outcome-determinism came in Lane Cotton Mills Co., II where the Board
refused to set aside a union's victory despite an allegation that two
Board representatives had made a modest wager on the election's
results. As the Board concluded, "[e]ven if it were proved that a
wager was in fact made between the Board supervisor and the Board
attorney, that fact could in no way affect the results of the election. "12 That
assertion may have been accurate, but the Board's reasoning left
single question of fact-what person or organization a majority of the employees in the
plant wish to have as their representative for collective bargaining." Id. at 1473.
10. 166 N.L.R.B. 966 (1967), vacated sub nom. International Union of Elec., Radio &
Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 67 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2361 (D.D.C.), acq. in result 171 N.L.R.B.
21 (1968), enforced, 423 F.2d 573 (1st Cir. 1970).
11. 9 N.L.R.B. 952 (1938), enforced, 111 F.2d 814 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 311 U.S.
723 (1940).
12. 9 N.L.R.B. at 956 (emphasis added). The Board also ruled that the employer
had "offered no evidence in support of its allegation that the Board supervisor advised
employees to vote for the [union]." Id. at 959.
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much to be desired. In particular, one wishes the Board had at least
discussed the possibility that the betting undermined faith in the
fairness of the election process by raising questions concerning the
Board's professional integrity and neutrality. The Board never even
addressed this concern, however, and over the next three decades
the Board proved highly reluctant to vacate elections when there
were allegations of agent partisanship.
A.

The Problem of Fraternization

One obvious manner in which the Board can appear biased arises
when fraternization occurs between a Board agent and representatives of either the employer or the union. In the pre-Athbro era,
however, the Board was very skeptical of such allegations. In National Plastic Products Co., 13 for example, the Board rejected an employer's argument that Board officials had contaminated election
conditions by riding to the polling site in a car with the union's representative. Although such fraternization with a party representative might readily suggest favoritism, the Board accepted the trial
examiner's conclusion that the conduct was "immaterial" in the absence of evidence that it was observed by any voting unit
employee. 14
Presumably, the Board reasoned that what the employees did not
know could not have "hurt" them in the sense of influencing their
votes. The potential flaw in such logic is that it ignored the effect
the fraternization may have had on the employees' post-election
perception of the Board's neutrality vis-a-vis the union. Although
the employees did not know of the fraternization before they voted,
they undoubtedly learned of it afterwards when the employer objected and may erroneously but understandably have concluded that
the Board was in league with the union. That misperception conceivably could have weakened the resolve of employees who might
have planned to have the union decertified1 5 or would consider fil13. 78 N.L.R.B. 699 (1948), enforced, 175 F.2d 755 (4th Cir. 1949).
14. 78 N.L.R.B. at 705.

15. As 29 U.S.C. § 159(e) provides:
(1) Upon the filing with the Board, by 30 per centum or more of the
employees in a bargaining unit covered by an agreenent between their

employer and a labor organization made pursuant to section 8(a)(3) [29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)], of a petition alleging they desire that such authority
be rescinded, the Board shall take a secret ballot of the employees in such
unit and certify the results thereof to such labor organization and to the
employer.
(2) No election shall be conducted pursuant to this subsection in any
bargaining unit or any subdivision within which, in the preceding twelvemonth period, a valid election shall have been held.
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ing charges against the union with the Board (such as for neglecting
its duty of fair representation). 16 In short, the Board's myopic focus
on whether the fraternization had influenced the results of a particular election failed to encompass the equally grave concern that employees might view the Board as a union sponsor rather than as a
neutral government agency committed to protecting their rights.' 7
The Board's order was enforced by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, however, in an opinion marked by
extreme judicial deference toward the Board's authority and expertise.' 8 Although the court observed that the Board itself had expressed disapproval of the fraternization,' 9 it concluded:
The determination of bargaining representatives under the act
is a matter that Congress has entrusted to the Board, not to
the courts; and when, as here, a certification is called in question in connection with a petition to enforce or review an order of the Board under section 10, 29 U.S.C.A. § 160, the
certification must be sustained in so far as fact questions are
concerned, if the fact findings of the Board made in connection therewith are based upon substantial evidence. In so far
as the certification involves the exercise of discretion, that is a
matter with which we are powerless to interfere so long as the
Board acts within the limits of the law.2 0
16. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) (holding that union breaches its duty
of fair representation when its conduct toward a member is arbitrary, discriminatory, or
in bad faith).
17. Furthermore, as one commentator has emphasized:
Because the Board remains responsible for administering all possible
future allegations concerning violations of the [Act], or for supervising
subsequent elections[,] misconduct or suggestions of partiality by the
Board agents conducting an election could tend to impair future
cooperation among the parties and the Board, and possibly between the
parties themselves.
WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 400.
18. NLRB v. National Plastic Prods. Co., 175 F.2d 755 (4th Cir. 1949).
In general, the Board's certification of election results may not be reviewed directly in
federal court. When a union is certified as the employees' bargaining representative,
however, the employer can seek judicial review in the following manner. First, it can
refuse to recognize the union as its employees' bargaining representative, which usually
prompts the union to file an unfair labor practice charge alleging that the employer has
violated 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (commonly known as § 8(a)(5) of the Act). Then, if the
Board finds the employer guilty, the employer may seek review of that finding in federal
circuit court under 29 U.S.C. § 160(f). Alternatively, the employer may simply ignore
the Board's bargaining order because such orders are not self-executing. The Board
must then petition the court of appeals for enforcement of its bargaining order pursuant
to 29 U.S.C. § 160(e). Under either approach, the employer can obtain judicial review
of the Board's certification of the union's electoral victory. For a more in-depth
discussion of the review process, see WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 20-23.
19. 175 F.2d at 758.
20. Id. (footnote omitted).
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The Fourth Circuit's conclusion, like the Board's order it enforced, may have been correct on the facts but it is marred by a lack
of reasoning to support it. First, neither the Board nor the court
gave a principled reason for refusing to consider the fraternization a
fatal defect in the election process. Instead, they impliedly accepted
the trial examiner's bald conclusion that the misconduct was immaterial because it was not witnessed by employees before casting their
ballots. That failure to justify this conclusion is particularly troublesome because it was not reached in conformity with any background
of statutory guidance, regulations, or prior Board or judicial decisions explaining when such fraternization would or would not necessitate the holding of a second election. The Board and the
Fourth Circuit were operating in a doctrinal vacuum, yet neither tribunal attempted to fill the void with a reasoned elaboration of new
standards. Second, the court's deference to the Board seems illsuited to a case where the Board has passed on the possible consequences of misconduct by its own agents. Although the Board must
resolve such issues in the first instance and its determinations are
entitled to substantial respect, 2 ' the court's plea that it was "powerless to interfere so long as the Board acts within the limits of the
law" is both circular and hollow in light of its failure to define those
limits. In sum, neither the Board nor the court offered any meaningful guidance on how the problem of fraternization should be addressed in subsequent cases.
In light of National Plastic Products, it is not surprising that most
objections concerning fraternization fell on deaf ears during the
pre-Athbro era. 2 2 NLRB v. Fresh'nd-Aire Co., 23 however, marks a partial break both from the Board's apparent lack of concern over fraternization and from the deference demonstrated by the court in
National Plastic Products. As the United States Court of Appeals for
21. As the Supreme Court later clarified in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340
U.S. 474 (1951), the federal courts of appeals are to affirm the Board's findings of fact if
they are supported by substantial evidence on the record taken as a whole.
22. See, e.g., Calcor Corp., 106 N.L.R.B. 539, 541 (1953) ("No inference of Board
support of the [union] would be likely to be drawn by employees merely because the
Board agent courteously accompanied a union representative to inspect the polling
place before the election began."); West Tex. Utils. Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 1012, 1014
(1952) (overruling employer's objection "that a close personal relation existed between
the Board agents and [a union] organizer" on the grounds that "[p]ersonal acquaintance
of a Board agent with a union representative is not, in itself, sufficient basis for setting
aside an election"); S.H. Kress & Co., 23 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1645 (1949) (original decision
unpublished) (holding there was no impropriety in Board agent's presence in
employer's store with union representatives). See also Griffin-Goodner Grocery Co., 73
N.L.R.B. 1332, 1336 (1947) (finding that there was no collusion between Board agent
and union representatives).
23. 226 F.2d 737 (7th Cir.), denying enforcement to 11 N.L.R.B. 158 (1955).
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the Seventh Circuit explained, the Board 24 initially vacated a union
victory because one of its field examiners investigating an unfair labor practice charge against the employer attended two union organizational meetings to obtain information and played piano at the
union's party for the workers shortly before the election. 2 5 The prophylactic value of the Board's ruling was undermined, however, by
its direction that the new election be held within thirty days, which
the employer argued did not permit sufficient time for any prejudicial effect of the fraternization to dissipate. Moreover, employees
apparently believed that the Board nullified the first election because of misconduct by the employer and the Board refused to notify them of the true cause of the vacatur or assure them that the
Board was neutral on the representation issue. Finally, the Board
certified the union's subsequent victory in the second election over
26
these objections.
The Seventh Circuit refused to enforce the Board's bargaining order, however, on the grounds that the Board had not gone far
enough to redress the potential prejudice stemming from the fraternization. The court first explained:
The conduct of the field examiner in attending both organizational meetings of the Union was indefensible. It is obvious
that the presence of a representative of the Board in the midst
of organizational activities of the petitioning Union gave an
apparent authority to the efforts of the petitioning Union
27
which violated the Board's duty of neutrality.
The court then reasoned:
Respondent [the employer] brought to the Board's attention, prior to the holding of the second election, the claim that
the Union was carrying on a campaign of misrepresentation in
stating that the second election was caused by some illegal or
improper action on the part of respondent. In view of the fact
that it was the actions of the Board's own representative which
caused the setting aside of the first election, it was the duty of
the Board to lean over backwards to be certain that the taint of
such conduct was not present when the second election was
held. In view of the alleged misrepresentation being then
made by the Union, we conceive it to have been the duty of the
Board to have acquainted the employees of respondent with

24. 106 N.L.R.B. No. 115 (1953), published in 32 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1529 (1953).
25. 226 F.2d at 739.
26. 111 N.L.R.B. 158 (1955).
27. 226 F.2d at 741.
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the true situation, and that failing to do so, the election was
28
unfair to respondent.
Based on this reasoning, the court concluded that "in fairness to
everyone ....another election should be held under conditions that
would demonstrate the impartiality of the Board as to the outcome
of that election." 29 That result seems eminently fair and reasonable. Given that the Board's field examiner had contaminated the
laboratory, equity demanded that the Board move vigorously to restore proper election conditions and to remove any remaining prejudice to the employer. Furthermore, the union could not
reasonably complain that its two victories were vacated when it was
a partner in the field examiner's misguided fraternization and had
distorted the reasoning behind the Board's call for a second election. In fact, the only disturbing aspect of Fresh'nd-Aire is that the
Board was reluctant to assume full responsibility for its agent's sins.
B.

The Problem of Allegedly Partisan Statements or Actions

In addition to fraternizing with a party representative, a Board
agent can undermine the Board's aura of neutrality through statements or actions that suggest bias in favor of a particular electoral
outcome. As with fraternization, however, the Board was quite reluctant to credit such objections during the pre-Athbro period.
Perhaps the most important case reflecting this reluctance was
Botany Worsted Mills.30 In Botany, the employer apparently violated
the Act and a circuit court decree by distributing bonuses on the eve
of the election and using the company newsletter and public address
system to direct employees to vote against the union. 3 l On the day
preceding the election the Board's regional director responded by
issuing a press release indicating his intent to recommend that the
Board find such actions unlawful and move to have the employer
held in contempt. 32 After the union was victorious, the employer
objected to the election on the grounds that "the issuance of the
press release constituted an improper and illegal interference with
the freedom of choice guaranteed by the Act to the employees, and
33
was calculated to influence a vote favorable to the Union."
This objection failed to move the Board. First, the Board emphasized that the issue was sui generis, stating:
28. Id.
29. Id. at 742.
30. 56 N.L.R.B. 370 (1944).

31. Id. at 371 n.4.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 371-72.
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The Act and the Rules and Regulations nowhere prescribe a
standard by which the conduct of a Board agent designated to
conduct or supervise the conducting of an election shall be
measured. Nor do the few cases which involve objections to a
Board agent's conduct in this respect delineate a zone of pro34
priety within which a Board agent must operate.
Having identified this indeterminacy, the Board should have
seized the opportunity to draw clear standards for guidance in subsequent cases. Instead, the Board simply chose to resolve the case
on its facts, concluding:
Confronted by the Company's continuing and increasing disregard of its obligation to remain neutral and by the consequently diminishing possibility of holding a free election, the
Regional Director here resorted to use of the press in an effort
to dissipate in some measure the effects of the Company's interference and thus restore the appropriate atmosphere for an
election. We consider that the imminence of the balloting and
the need to reach the employees upon as nearly similar a scale
as that upon which the Company had improperly influenced
them provide a sufficiently reasonable basis for the Regional
35
Director's action.
In other words, the regional director could fight fire with fire.
This rationale is disturbing for at least three reasons. First, condoning the regional director's media campaign undermines the Board's
normative role in assuring free elections by making the Board's
sanctity a relative matter: how prejudicial was the regional director's conduct in comparison with the employer's illicit tactics that it
sought to counterbalance? This approach seems at odds with the
fundamental requirement that the Board maintain its neutrality in
the electoral process regardless of an employer's or union's unlawful practices. By excusing the regional director's media retaliation
on the grounds that it was necessary to overcome the effects of the
employer's misconduct, the Board sent the perverse message that its
actions could mirror prejudicial election tactics in order to negate
them.
Second, the Board approved of the regional director's tactics even
though he could have relied upon less prejudicial alternatives to
safeguard the workers' freedom of choice. As the Board itself recognized, even if the employer's unfair ploys had succeeded the
Board could have nullified and condemned them by vacating the result of the balloting, ordering a new election, and charging the em34. Id. at 372 n.5.
35. Id. at 383.
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ployer with unfair labor practices. 3 6 In that manner the Board could
have denounced prejudicial election tactics, censured the employer,
deterred others from similar misconduct, and protected the workers' freedom without jeopardizing its own claim of neutrality and
calling into question the legitimacy of its methods. Instead, the
Board permitted the regional director to escalate the war of words
in a manner that could well have increased the employees' confusion regarding the role of the Board in representation elections.
Third, and perhaps most regrettable, the Board squandered the
opportunity to lay down clear and practical guidelines for determining when the misconduct of Board representatives would necessitate
vacating elections. The Board presumably recognized that in some
instances new elections must be ordered to offset its representatives' suggestions of bias. But when? Whenever such possible bias
has undermined the Board's standards of integrity and impartiality?
Or, only when the appearance of bias actually may have affected the
results of the balloting? Unfortunately, the Botany Board failed to
discuss, much less resolve, the competing considerations it would
need to assess in future cases.
Perhaps the Board by-passed this opportunity because it simply
did not believe that isolated allegations of bias posed a serious
threat to its legitimacy. In fact, the pre-Athbro decisions demonstrate the Board's lack of concern over statements by its agents that
employees could have construed or reasonably misconstrued as indicating that the Board favored one particular side in representation
elections. In United States Gypsum Co., 3 7 for example, the Board's
agent allegedly stated that the union representative had made a
"good objection" when the representative protested a certain vote
during the tallying of ballots. Although the employer objected to
that statement (presumably on the grounds that the agent had
prejudged a matter the Board would need to resolve), the Board
tersely concluded that "[t]he Board agent's expression of opinion is
immaterial and in no way establishes the existence of a valid objection." 3 8 While the Board's conclusion may be defensible, its lack of
reasoning is not. Was the Board implying that an agent's "expression of opinion" is always "immaterial"? Or are such statements
material only if they occurred before balloting was completed and
possibly could have influenced the employees' votes? Or was the
36. Id. at 382-83. In addition, the circuit court presumably could have held the
employer in contempt for defying its earlier order.
37. 92 N.L.R.B. 1661, 1662-63 (1951).
38. Id. at 1663.
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statement of opinion in this case simply de minimis under the circumstances? Once again, the Board left these issues unresolved.
H.E. Fletcher Co. 3 9 also demonstrated the Board's lack of concern
and reasoned analysis. In Fletcher, the employer argued that a Board
agent gave force to union propaganda that the employer was unlawfully padding the list of eligible voters with pro-management personnel by sardonically stating that one challenged voter resembled
the "[p]resident of the First National Bank." 40 The Board, however,
affirmed the regional director's conclusion that the agent's sarcasm
had not "interfered with the free choice of the voters at the election
or... lent credence to the purported 'Padding' propaganda of the
union, particularly since it occurred after the polls were closed." 4'
While this explanation suggests that the criterion for evaluating alleged statements of bias was whether they could have influenced the
election's outcome, neither the regional director nor the Board
chose to clarify this matter.
If anything, the Fletcher opinion indicated that the Board would
not thoroughly review the possible ramifications of its agents' remarks. This obtuseness has plagued the Board's opinions since, at
least, its decision in Craddock-Terry Shoe Corp.4 2 in 1948. In CraddockTerry, the United Shoe Workers of America was elected by the employees, but the employer objected based, in part, on the contemptuous attitude of the Board agents supervising the election. In the
first alleged incident, a Board agent stated, to a woman questioning
why her right to vote had been challenged, "Shut up. If you were a
lady you would act like one." 4 3 Such language plainly demeans voters (especially women) and could undermine the freedom and dignity the Act was intended to protect. Nevertheless, the (exclusively
male) Board dismissed this challenge, concluding: "While we disapprove of the use of language of this character by a Board agent, we
do not think that it could have restrained or influenced a prospec44
tive voter in the casting of his [or her?] vote."
The second alleged incident arose when the employer's vice president protested that a worker should not be permitted to vote because he was intoxicated on the job, a violation of company rules.
One of the Board's agents disagreed, however, and led the worker
39. 121 N.L.R.B. 826 (1958).
40. Id. at 828. In other words, the Board agent allegedly was remarking that the
challenged voter obviously was not a blue-collar voting unit employee.
41. Id. at 830.
42. 80 N.L.R.B. 1239 (1948).

43. Id. at 1240. For a discussion of the voter challenging process see infra note 244
and accompanying text.
44. 80 N.L.R.B. at 1240.
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to the polls. Furthermore, two Board agents allegedly ridiculed the
vice president for raising this challenge and their disparagement
may have been overheard by certain employees. 4 5 If true, this
clearly could have instilled doubts among the voters concerning the
Board's lack of respect for the employer and its supposed neutrality
in the election. The Board, however, overruled this objection claiming that "neither seeing [the employee accused of drunkenness]
conducted by a Board agent nor overhearing the allegedly derogatory remarks would tend to restrain or influence the vote of any
employee.' '46
Such reasoning is inadequate because the Board did not seriously
consider whether the offensive statements to the female voter or the
ridicule of the vice president could have raised doubts regarding the
depth and sincerity of the Board's self-professed concern for worker
dignity and impartial elections. As dissenting Board members
Herzog and Gray asserted, these unprofessional acts by the Board's
agents, combined with the employer's allegations of misconduct by
the union, raised sufficient questions concerning the integrity of the
balloting process to require a Board hearing on the employer's objections. 4 7 "As the integrity of the Board's own process is in45. Id. at 1241-42.
46. Id. at 1242.
47. Id. at 1245. It is important to note that parties challenging an election are not
automatically entitled to a hearing on their objections. As the Board has explained:
Section 102.69 of the Board's Rules and Regulations sets forth election
procedures, including the handling of objections. It provides for the
holding of a hearing when it appears to the Board that exceptions to the
report of a Regional Director on objections raise substantial and material
factual issues. In accordance therewith, the Board has held that unless
substantial and material issues of fact are raised a request for a hearing
will be denied. The Board has rejected the contention that a Respondent
is entitled as a matter of right to a hearing on objections to an election.
In order to prevent delay in election procedure the Board has uniformly
refused to direct a hearing on objections unless the party supplies specific
evidence of conduct which prima facie would warrant setting aside the
election.
O.K. Van & Storage, Inc., 127 N.L.R.B. 1537, 1539 (1960) (footnotes omitted), enforced,
297 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1961).
This reluctance to grant hearings has been the subject of perceptive criticism. As one
scholar argues:
By granting the party which has alleged that the election has been unfairly conducted an opportunity to subpoena witnesses, cross-examine
the agent involved, and generally air the facts surrounding the claim of
impropriety, the Board would do much to overcome the notion that it
actually is partial in election matters. Such hearings would also dispel
any suspicions that the Board is more concerned with concealing the mistakes of its own staff members than with fairly effectuating the election
procedures of the Act. At the same time, it may be assumed that most
allegations of partiality and election tampering would prove unfounded if
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volved," they reasoned, it was advisable to "apply a stricter standard
48
to this case than our colleagues seem to think necessary."
In sum, during the pre-Athbro era the Board displayed extreme
skepticism toward allegations that its representatives had engaged
in biased behavior. 4 9 Furthermore, as Bullard Co. v. NLRB 50 reveals,
even when the Board took an idealistic step toward preserving the
integrity of its election procedures, that effort was promptly nullified in federal court. In Bullard, the Board set aside an employer's
victory based on allegations that a Board agent mishandled ballots,
constantly wandered from the polling area, and gave the appearance
of bias by eating lunch with the employer's representatives and protesting whenever the union challenged ballots. 5 ' As the Board
explained:
The objections relate to alleged irregularities by the Board
agent conducting the election. Although, as the Regional Director concluded, the Board agent did not in fact engage in any irregularities, there is a possibility that some of his conduct may erroneously
have given such an appearance. The mere appearance of irregularity in a Board agent's conduct of an election departs from
the standards the Board seeks to maintain in assuring the integrity and secrecy of its elections and constitutes a basis for
setting aside the election. 52
tested through the hearing process. Hence, the election results could be
certified in most cases without the greater delay and uncertainty of rerun
elections.
WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 427. Williams' proposal would certainly be a step in the right
direction, but I would caution that the ordering of a second election might still prove
necessary in many cases to remove the appearance of Board partiality.
48. 80 N.L.R.B. at 1245 (dissenting opinion). Curiously, neither the majority
opinion nor the dissent discussed General Shoe's emphasis on the need to maintain
laboratory conditions even though that opinion was penned less than eight months prior
to Craddoch-Terry.

49. In addition to the decisions discussed above, see e.g., Neuhoff Bros., Packers,
Inc., 154 N.L.R.B. 438 (1965) (holding that Board agent did not spoil laboratory
conditions by refusing to permit thirteen supposed supervisors to cast challenged
ballots), enforced, 362 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 956 (1967);
Hammond-Hohman Corp., III N.L.R.B. 1094, 1096 (1955) (concluding that "the
Employer's contention that the questions of the General Counsel's representative in her
pretrial interview of witnesses could reasonably have led to an inference that the Board
was ... biased against the Employer, is not supported by the record"); Morris Harris, 72
N.L.R.B. 494, 496 (1947) (holding that Board agent's remarks to employees were not
"sufficient to warrant the setting aside of the election"); Paragon Rubber Co., 8
N.L.R.B. 690 (1938) (overruling union's objection that it had been prejudiced by the
manner in which a Board representative had questioned challenged voters).
50. 253 F. Supp. 391 (D.D.C. 1966).
51. Id. at 391-92.
52. Id. at 392 (emphasis added by the court in its quotation of the Board's
unpublished opinion).
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This idealistic approach (which was to be resurrected in Athbro)
was short-lived, however, for the employer successfully petitioned
the federal district court to order certification of its electoral victory
and to enjoin the Board from requiring a second election. As Judge
Gasch declared:
The decision and order of the Board recites that the Board
agent did not, in fact, engage in any irregularities. Thus, the
"possibility that some of his conduct may erroneously have
given such an appearance," in no way affects the validity of the
election. The Court finds that the efforts of the Board to
maintain the highest standards in the conduct of its elections
to be a commendable goal. But when the pursuit of this goal
results in the setting aside of an admittedly valid election and
the refusal to certify the results thereof, contrary to statutory
duty, the Court is of the opinion that it has a duty to enjoin the
53
Board from subjecting an employer to a second election.
In one paragraph, therefore, a federal court curtailed the Board's
idealistic endeavor to protect the integrity of its election procedures
from even the appearance of bias and irregularity. This result foreshadowed a similar development in Athbro itself, which will be discussed at length in Part III of this Article. For present purposes, it
suffices to emphasize that even when the Board finally began a vigorous defense of its perceived integrity and impartiality, a federal
court condemned rather than nurtured that process.
The Board's aborted Bullard decision, however, was an exception
rather than the rule during the pre-Athbro era. In general, the Board
might admonish its agents for misconduct but would not invalidate
elections for that reason alone. And perhaps the Board was right in
certifying at least some of these tainted elections. The problem is
not so much with the Board's conclusions as with its inability or refusal to support them in a principled fashion. The Board obviously
reached results, but it did so without delineating and resolving the
competing policy concerns that administrators and judges would
need to address in the years ahead.

53. Id. at 395. Judge Gasch also emphasized that the Board had not found that the
appearance of irregularity "had in any way affected the outcome of the election" and
suggested in dicta that ordering a new election in these circumstances could conceivably
deprive the employer of its due process rights. Id.
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NEW DAWN OR FALSE LIGHT?

In Athbro Precision Engineering Corp., 54 the Board resurrected the
spirit of its Bullard opinion by showing pronounced sensitivity toward the problem of apparent favoritism and by focusing on
whether the Board's aura of neutrality had been tarnished. In Athbro, an employee who already had voted observed the Board agent
in charge of the election drinking beer with a union representative
during a recess in the polling. This fraternization occurred approximately one mile away from the employer's plant, was not observed
by any other employees, and the employer did not allege that it had
affected the votes of the workers. The employer still argued, however, that the union's victory should be invalidated because "the behavior of the Board Agent gave an appearance of irregularity to the
conduct of the election, thus departing from the standards of integ55
rity which the Board seeks to maintain."
This argument seemed doomed in light of the decisions discussed
in Part II of this Article. In a unanimous opinion by members Fanning, Jenkins, and Zagoria, however, the Board reasoned that
whether a Board agent's conduct affects the votes of employees is
not "the only test to apply." 5 6 To the contrary, the Board declared:
The Board in conducting representation elections must
maintain and protect the integrity and neutrality of its procedures. The commission of an act by a Board Agent conducting an election which tends to destroy confidence in the
Board's election process, or which could reasonably be interpreted as impugning the election standards we seek to5 7maintain, is a sufficient basis for setting aside that election.
With this language the Board appeared to override decades of
doctrine concerning the problem of possible bias. Since, at least,
Lane Cotton Mills Co., 58 the Board typically had refused to invalidate
elections unless the Board's perceived bias could have altered the
results of the election "experiment." Now, however, the Board
moved to protect the perceived sanctity of the voting process and the
good name of its administrative laboratory. No longer would an aggrieved employer or union need to demonstrate that Board bias had
54. 166 N.L.R.B. 966 (1967), vacated sub nom. International Union of Elec., Radio &
Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 67 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2361 (D.D.C.), acq. in result, 171 N.L.R.B.
21 (1968), enforced, 423 F.2d 573 (1st Cir. 1970).
55. 166 N.L.R.B. at 966.
56. Id.

57. Id.
58. 9 N.L.R.B. 952 (1938) enforced, 111 F.2d 814 (5th Cir.) cert. dismissed, 311 U.S. 723
(1940). For a discussion of Lane Cotton Mills see supra notes 11-12 and accompanying
text.
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tipped the scales; it would suffice to show that the misconduct was of
the sort "which tends to destroy confidence" in the election process
or "which could reasonably be interpreted as impugning the
' 59
[Board's] election standards.
Athbro's effect, however, was weakened by several factors. First,
the opinion was uncommonly brief and failed to explain its departure from Lane Cotton Mills and its progeny. Although Athbro appeared to signal a crucial turning point in the jurisprudence of
representation elections, the decision was merely a one-page statement which failed to cite the Board's opinion in Bullard or any other
administrative, judicial, or scholarly authority for its conclusion.
Furthermore, the Board did not reinforce its admirable idealism
with any meaningful elaboration of how its new standard should be
applied. 60 The Athbro Board may have purported to bring forth a
new day regarding the problem of perceived bias, but it left its standard vulnerable to manipulation and misapplication in the years
ahead.
Athbro's vitality was further jeopardized by its subsequent procedural history. After the Board rendered its decision, the union
sought an injunction in federal district court to compel the Board to
certify its electoral triumph. This injunction was granted in International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers v. NLRB, 61 where
Judge Sirica emphasized practical costs at the expense of the
Board's idealism. Judge Sirica emphasized that no one had suggested that the Board agent's fraternization had affected the employees' votes. Furthermore, if the court vacated the election it
would effectively impose two costs upon the union. First, the
union's "right" to represent the employees would "be irretrievably
denied as to the time it would take to conduct a new election." Second, "[t]he process of preparing for and participating in a second
election would be expensive and burdensome. '"62
Judge Sirica then argued that "[t]he Board's finding that there
was no possible effect upon the election resulting from the conduct
of its agent is tantamount to recognition that the election was
valid." 6 3 Without supporting that assertion with any reasoning or
59. Athbro, 166 N.L.R.B. at 966.
60. As one observer has argued, "The problem with the Athbro standard is that the

Board has not given any clear guidance about what constitutes interference . ...
Moreover, if the Athbro test is used, there is room for disagreement regarding what is
'reasonably . . . interpreted as impugning the election standards.' " WILLIAMS, supra

note 4, at 402.
61. 67 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2361 (D.D.C. 1968).
62. Id. at 2363.
63. Id.
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case law, 64 Judge Sirica concluded that the Board's decision was arbitrary and capricious, denied both the union and employees their
rights under the Act, and violated "the plain and mandatory provisions of Section 9(c)(1) of the Act [29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)], which
directs the Board to certify the results of such representation
elections."65
The Board could have maintained its position, appealed the injunction, and attacked Judge Sirica's reasoning on numerous
grounds. First, the Board could have argued that the Judge's emphasis on the costs of rerunning the election ignored the far greater,
more costly risk of undermining the Board's legitimacy in the eyes
of workers, management, unions, and the public. Furthermore,
there would be nothing unfair about requiring the union to bear the
costs of a second election given that it was a union representative's
misconduct-fraternizing with the Board agent on election daythat undermined the Board's appearance of impartiality. If anything, it would have seemed equitable to require the union to pay
the employer's reasonable campaign expenses, given that its hands
had been clean in the initial election.
Judge Sirica's statutory interpretation was equally suspect.
Although section 9(c)(1) of the Act requires the Board to "certify
the results" of elections, that statutory directive is predicated on the
assumption that the election is valid. The Board enjoys substantial
discretion in determining this threshold issue of validity, 6 6 and
nothing in the Act or its legislative history 6 7 supports Judge Sirica's
fundamental premise that an election is valid per se if a Board
agent's misconduct does not affect the votes of employees.
The Board, however, declined to pursue these points. Instead, it
rejected the employer's urges to appeal, accepted Judge Sirica's
opinion as the law of the case, and ordered the employer to bargain
with the union. 6 8 Such reticence seems curious and cannot help but
raise questions regarding the strength of the Board's commitment
toward preserving faith in its election standards. Indeed, the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit chastised the Board for
64. Notwithstanding the clear ideological symmetry between his opinion and Judge
Gasch's reasoning in Bullard,Judge Sirica did not cite that opinion. See supra notes 50-53
and accompanying text.
65. 67 L.R.R.M. at 2363.
66. See, e.g., NLRB v. National Plastic Prods. Co., 175 F.2d 755, 758 (4th Cir. 1949),
enforcing 78 N.L.R.B. 699 (1948). For a discussion of National Plastics see supra notes 1321 and accompanying text.
67. See NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 1935

(reprint ed. 1985).
68. Athbro Precision Eng'g Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 21, 21 & n.3 (1968).
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lacking the courage of its convictions in NLRB v. Athbro Precision Engineering Corp.69 This case reached the First Circuit when the employer refused to comply with the bargaining order that the Board
issued when it acquiesced in Judge Sirica's opinion. The court emphasized the extent of its disagreement with Judge Sirica's analysis:
The Board's role in overseeing elections is not limited to mere
ballot-counting. It has broad discretion in the establishment
of procedures and safeguards to insure fairness. We cannot
think that the Board, any less than a court, is uninterested in
maintaining, as well as fairness, the appearance of fairness.
The Board's public image provides the basis for its existence.
The re-running of an occasional election is a small price to pay
for the preservation of public respect. The union was peculiarly in no position to complain, since its representative par70
ticipated in the improper conduct.
For these reasons, the First Circuit concluded that the Board "had
made the correct decision" in its original Athbro holding. 7 ' The
court enforced the Board's acquiescent bargaining order, however,
because neither the Board nor the employer had appealed from
Judge Sirica's injunction. As the court concluded, "[w]e would have
more sympathy with this if the Board had appealed, and lost. Any
72
present embarrassment is of its own making."
The court's admonition was well taken, as the Board boldly had
announced a new standard of idealism yet failed to follow through
by defending it in the appellate arena. Indeed, as demonstrated below, the Board's ambivalence toward the Athbro standard has continued over the past two decades. At times, the Board vigorously has
enforced the philosophy that elections must be set aside whenever
an agent's actions suggest favoritism toward one of the competing
parties. At other times, however, the Board has certified elections in
the face of possible bias on the grounds that any misconduct could
not have affected the balloting. The result of this wavering commitment to idealism has been to engender confusion, to provoke burdensome litigation, and to undermine the normative message Athbro
originally was intended to impart.
IV.

THE POST-ATHBRO ERA: TENSIONS AND CONTRADICTIONS

Although the Board occasionally has resuscitated the Athbro standard of idealism, its application of that principle has been highly
69.
70.
71.
72.

423 F.2d 573 (1st Cir. 1970).
Id. at 575 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
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selective and Athbro has been "honored" in the breach more often
than in practice. The circuit courts also have mirrored this confusion: some appellate decisions have rigorously held a reluctant
Board to the Athbro standard while others have ignored its principle
or applied it in a grudging fashion. This inconsistent applicationand the uncertainty it begets-can be demonstrated by analyzing
cases involving fraternization, the delegation of Board agent duties
to private parties, allegations of partisan statements or actions, and
allegations of other breaches in administrative professionalism.
A.

The Problem of Fraternization

Given that Athbro itself involved a charge of improper association
between a Board agent and a party representative, it is useful to begin this analysis of the post-Athbro era by focusing on the problem of
fraternization. As explained below, despite Athbro the Board has
been markedly reluctant to invalidate elections despite highly questionable associations between its agents and parties to representation elections.
First, the Board consistently has refused to set aside election results simply because its agents investigated charges of unfair labor
practices during a representation campaign. This refusal has a
questionable foundation, especially to the accused, because it conceivably could convey the impression that the. Board views the investigated party as a "wrongdoer" and that the employees consequently should support its opponent. In fact, in Amax Aluminum Extrusion Products,73 the Board cautioned:
[I]n most circumstances, it would be better practice for the
Board agent conducting an election to refrain from investigating unfair labor practice charges between shifts of the election.
It has long been Board policy that elections be conducted in as
"laboratory" an atmosphere as possible, and, where feasible,
this could best be accomplished if the conduct of the election
were kept separate from the investigation of unfair labor practice charges, which charges, of course, may eventually prove
7
baseless. "
Nevertheless, the Board overruled the employer's objection because "[o]nly three employees were interviewed, all off the Employer's premises, and there is no evidence other employees saw the
interviewing, or became aware of it. We find the evidence insuffi73. 172 N.L.R.B. 1401 (1968).
74. Id. at 1401 n.1.
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cient to establish that the conduct of the Board agent affected the
'75
results of the election."
Amax demonstrates how far and how fast the Board retreated from
the idealism expressed in Athbro. Although the same Board members authored each opinion-Fanning, Jenkins, and Zagoria-in
Amax the Board withdrew from its foothold of idealism and meekly
applied the outcome-determinative test of Judge Sirica. The Board
76
adhered to Amax two years later in Kimco Auto Products of Mississippi,
where less than a month before the election the supervising Board
agent served as a trial attorney for the Board in an unfair labor practice case, against the employer. Although the Board reiterated that
"wherever practical, the Board's Regional Offices should, and normally do, keep the conduct of elections completely separate from
the investigation or trial of contemporaneous unfair labor practice
charges involving the same parties," 77 it accepted the regional director's rationale that only two rank-and-file employees had attended
the trial and that even if their votes had been swayed by the pro78
ceedings the union still would have won the election.
Ti-City Linen Supply 79 was to similar effect. The Ti-City Board
simply ruled that upon the request of the charging party, a regional
director may proceed with an election despite charges of unfair labor practices. 80 This conclusion was approved by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which expressly rejected "any
suggestion that scheduling an election contemporaneously with an
unfair labor practice investigation constitutes an abuse of discretion
per se. "81
Tri-City is noteworthy because the employer sought to demonstrate that the Board agent's questioning of an employee actually
had affected his vote. Allegedly, the employee was so confused by
75. Id. (citing International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 67
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2361 (D.D.C. 1968), discussed supra in notes 61-67 and accompanying

text).
76. 184 N.L.R.B. 599 (1970).
77. Id. at 599 n.l.
78. Id. at 600. Of course, more than two votes may have been affected if the
employees related their observations to their coworkers. The regional director belittled
that possibility, however, on the grounds that the hearing occurred more than two weeks
before the election and took place "a substantial distance" from the employer's plant.
Id. More importantly, neither the regional director nor the Board showed any
remembrance of Athbro's focus on preserving the Board's appearance of integrity and

impartiality.
79.
(1976),
80.
81.

223 N.L.R.B. 21, summary judgment granted in related proceedings, 226 N.L.R.B. 669
enforced, 579 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1978).
223 N.L.R.B. at 21 n.l.
579 F.2d at 57 n.14.
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the investigation that he abandoned his intention to vote against the
union and instead cast a blank ballot. The administrative law judge
barred such evidence, however, on the grounds that it had "no probative value in view of the subjective nature of the proffered testimony." 8 2 The Ninth Circuit upheld that determination, explaining
that "[s]ubjective declarations of intent are not admissible to show
83
how an employee would have voted."
This trio of cases demonstrates how it is virtually impossible for a
party to overturn election results simply because it was being investigated on unfair labor practice charges during or shortly before the
balloting. The Board has refused to hold that such investigations
are necessarily objectionable, especially when there is no proof that
they have affected an election's results. Moreover, the Board has
placed the additional hurdle of barring parties from proving outcome-determinism by introducing testimony regarding an employee's voting intentions. On balance, this may be the lesser of two
evils; one would not want an employer or union to be able to postpone elections indefinitely by bringing, or deliberately incurring, a
succession of unfair labor practice charges. The downside, however, is that parties may strategically file such charges in the hope
that employees will presume the charged party is guilty and vote in
accordance with that possibly erroneous conclusion.
A different issue arises, however, when the Board agent's investigation becomes so indiscreet that it suggests favoritism toward one
of the parties. As in Fresh'nd-Aire, both Board members8 4 and
judges 85 have recognized that an agent could impermissibly taint an
election if his investigation took on a social flavor that could create
the appearance of bias. The Board and courts have not been successful, however, in consistently differentiating what separates an
impartial investigation from an objectionable form of fraternization.
For example, in Isaacson-CarricoManufacturing Co. 8 6 the Board certified an election even though the employer introduced testimony
that on election day an agent ate lunch at the union hall, shot pool
with union advocates, and was "laughing and acting silly." As one
worker testified, "[i]t just seemed odd because I mean the Labor
Board was supposed to be neutral . . .I mean it just didn't seem
82. 223 N.L.R.B. at 27.
83. 579 F.2d at 58 n.16 (citing T & G Mfg. Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 1503 (1969)).
84. 106 N.L.R.B. No. 115 (1953), published in 32 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1529 (1953).
85. NLRB v. Fresh'nd-Aire, 226 F.2d 737 (7th Cir.), denying enforcement to 111
N.L.R.B. 158 (1955). For a discussion of Fresh'nd-Aire, see supra notes 23-29 and
accompanying text.
86. 200 N.L.R.B. 788, 800-02 (1972).
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right to me at that time." 8 7 The trial examiner, however, discredited this testimony because of conflicting statements by other witnesses and concluded that the alleged fraternization had not created
"a general atmosphere of fear and reprisal" and "was not such as to
have destroyed the employees' freedom of choice." 8 8 This decision
was accepted by the Board with virtually no discussion.8 9
The Board showed similar insensitivity toward investigation cum
fraternization in ProvincialHouse, Inc.90 In Provincial House, the employer objected to the union's victory because an agent took affidavits for an unfair labor practice case against the employer at a
restaurant where the union was concurrently holding a campaign
meeting and was introduced to the audience of voting unit employees. 9 ' Although the hearing officer purported to apply the principles expressed by the Board in Athbro, he overruled the objection
based on his reading of Amax and Isaacson-Carricoand concluded that
the fraternization "was not such so as to undermine the Board's
processes or any confidence herein" and "did not have an impact
'9 2
upon the election . . .which the [union] won by a large margin."
This decision was adopted by the Board over the dissent of Chairman Murphy, who argued that "the foregoing conduct could have
given the impression to the employees who attended the meeting
that the Board was not truly impartial in this election campaign and
93
instead favored the Union."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, however, wisely refused to enforce the Board's bargaining order. Stat87. Id. at 802.
88. Id. Ironically, the trial examiner quoted Athbro in his decision, but made no effort
either to distinguish that decision or to apply its reasoning to the facts of the case before
him. Id. at 800.
89. Id. at 788. See also Queen City Foundry, 73 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1345, 1346-48
(1970) (holding that friendly conversation between Board agent and union
representative was a harmless "exchange of amenities between two persons who had
had previous contact in connection with their jobs").
90. 221 N.L.R.B. 5 (1975), summary judgment granted in related proceedings, 222 N.L.R.B.
1300 (1976), enforcement denied, 568 F.2d 8 (6th Cir. 1977).
91. 221 N.L.R.B. at 6-7.
92. Id. at 7-8.
93. Id. at 6 (Murphy, dissenting). The difference between the treatment given to
Athbro by the hearing officer and Chairman Murphy is both ironic and informative.
Whereas the former viewed the Board's original opinion in Athbro as stating a still-valid
principle but apparently believed it had not been violated in this case, the latter noted
that the Athbro Board had acquiesced in Judge Sirica's opinion but concluded that the
fraternization in this case was distinguishably more serious. Id. at 5-6 (Murphy,
dissenting). This disparate treatment of Athbro demonstrates the Board's uncertainty
both as to the meaning of the Athbro principle and to the question of whether it was still a
valid Board precedent. The Board's majority opinion did not even bother to cite Athbro,
much less discuss its vitality and application. Id. at 5.
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ing that it would apply "the Board's own rule" to this case, the court
concluded:
[I]t should be possible for any NLRB representative to keep
from becoming a part of a union organizing meeting. And
when such a representative (voluntarily or involuntarily) becomes a part of such a meeting (absent extraordinary circumstances), we think that NLRB neutrality, in either fact or
appearance, has been so compromised as to warrant setting
aside the election and holding a new one.
While we agree with the Board that the size of the union
majority in this case [52-17] was such as to make it quite unlikely that the NLRB representative's appearance at the meeting had any decisive effect on the result, we do not think that is
the issue in this case. What we deal with here is an act by a
Board Agent which tends to destroy "the neutrality, of the
'94
Board's procedures."
The Board also issued a bargaining order that a circuit court refused to enforce in Delta Drilling Co., 9 5 where the Board refused to

consider an employer's objections on the grounds that they could
have been raised in an earlier representation proceeding. The
Board explained:
It is established Board policy, in the absence of newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence, not to permit litigation before a Trial Examiner in a complaint case of issues
which were or could have been litigated in a prior related representation proceeding. This policy is applicable even though
no formal hearing on objections has been provided by the
Board. Such a hearing is not a matter of right unless substantial and material issues are raised; and that there are not such
96
issues here has been effectively decided by the Board.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refused
to enforce this decision in an opinion 97 which relied heavily upon
the Board's own reasoning in Athbro. In Delta Drilling Co., the employer objected that on election day the Board agent who was conducting the polling entered a union representative's motel room to
"freshen up." 98 Even though this fraternization was witnessed only
94. Provincial House, Inc. v. NLRB, 568 F.2d 8, 10-11 (6th Cir. 1977) (citing Athbro
Precision Eng'g Corp., 166 N.L.R.B. 966 (1967)). The Board acquiesced in the court's
opinion in Provincial House, Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 926 (1978).
95. 169 N.L.R.B. 617 (1968), enforcement denied, 406 F.2d 109 (5th Cir. 1969).
96. 169 N.L.R.B. at 618 (footnotes omitted).
97. Delta Drilling Co. v. NLRB, 406 F.2d 109 (5th Cir. 1969).
98. Id. at 110.
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by a company supervisor, who was not an eligible voter, 99 the court
concluded that the election was fatally flawed:
[T]he undisputed fact [is] that a Board Agent, while an election was in process, and while he had the ballot box in his
physical possession, was seen by a company supervisor going
to, remaining in, and coming out of the room of a motel where
presumably if he needed space there was plenty available without closeting himself with a Union representative. There are
no witnesses to what went on in the room but the two participants, neither of whom had any business participating in such
activity, under such circumstances, while an election was in
progress....
We hold that an employer who enters into a consent agreement, relying upon the unflinching preservation of Board policy, is entitled to the benefit of that reliance, especially when
the questionable activity of a Board Agent occurs without his
knowledge or participation. Additionally, if the benefits and
advantages of consent elections are to be maintained, preserved, and utilized, the employer is entitled to that same degree of confidence in the election process as counsel concedes
the employee is entitled to have. Of course, the Board recognized this in Athbro when it sustained the employer's
objections.' 0 0
Delta Drilling and ProvincialHouse demonstrate how far the Board
had drifted from the ideological moorings of Athbro. In each of
these cases the Board chose to ignore or minimize the importance
of fraternization that could have raised doubts concerning the
Board's neutrality, and in each it was left to a circuit court to breathe
new life into Athbro. This reluctance of the Board to practice what it
had earlier preached could only undermine Athbro's original normative power and breed uncertainty as to what standards the Board
would apply in future cases.
The Board continued its myopic approach in Osborn Transportation,
Inc., 101 where the employer objected that the same agent who conducted the election had earlier investigated an unfair labor practice
charge against it in a motel room rented by a union representative.
According to a witness, several employees and two union representatives were in the room with the Board agent and consumed alcohol
0 2
and addressed her by her first name while she interviewed them.'
99. Id. at 113.
100. Id. at 113-14.
101. 226 N.L.R.B. 1370 (1976), summary judgment granted in related proceedings, 232
N.L.R.B. 821 (1977), enforced, 589 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1979).
102. 226 N.L.R.B. at 1371.
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The acting regional director overruled this objection on the
grounds that "the taking of statements under the circumstances described, while not to be condoned, does not in any manner identify
the Board sufficiently with [the union] so as to influence employee
votes in an election to be held six weeks later."' 0 3 This report was
adopted by the Board majority' 0 4 without any discussion of Athbro,
Delta Drilling, or ProvincialHouse.
In contrast to its stance in Delta Drilling, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided to enforce the Board's bargaining order.' 0 5 The court first sought to distinguish Athbro and Delta
Drilling, stating:
[Tihe Board could reasonably decide that the Board agent's
conduct in this case did not violate the Athbro neutrality rule.
In both Athbro and Delta Drilling the Board agent was observed
fraternizing with a union representative on the day of the election and in neither case was the agent engaged in pursuing an
official function when he associated with the union representative. In this case, however, the Board agent went to the union
representative's motel room for the express purpose of conducting an official investigation of unfair labor practice
charges filed by the union against the company. There is no
evidence that the agent in this case engaged in the kind of
public fraternization with one of the parties to the election
condemned in Athbro and Delta Drilling. .

.

. We hold that the

Board could reasonably conclude that its agent's conduct in
taking affidavits in a union-supplied room six weeks before the
election did not compromise the integrity and neutrality of the
06
Board's procedures. 1

The distinction the court drew between Athbro and Delta Drilling
on the one hand and Osborn Transportation on the other has some
merit: there is a clear difference between a Board agent's investigation of charges and a Board agent's quaffing beer with a union representative or using a representative's motel room to "freshen up."
One wonders, however, about the circumstances surrounding the
Board agent's interviews. Was it proper for the interviews to take
place in the room of a union representative? While both voting unit
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1370. Board Chairman Murphy dissented, citing her earlier dissent in
ProvincialHouse, Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 5, 5 (1976), because she disagreed with the majority's
conclusion that the event "could not have given employees ... the impression that the
Board was not truly impartial in this campaign." Id. at 1370 n.3.
105. NLRB v. Osborn Transp., Inc., 589 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1979). Note, however,
that the circuit panels in Delta Drilling and Osborn Transportation were composed of

different judges.
106. Id. at 1280-81 (footnote and citations omitted).
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employees and union representatives were present? While alcohol
was being consumed and the interviewees were referring to the
Board agent on a first-name basis? Or, did these circumstances intentionally or unintentionally convey an impression of partisanship,
as in ProvincialHouse? In both cases, the Board's agent took affidavits in a room reserved by the union, where alcohol was served, and
where the Board agent was introduced to voting unit employees.
Indeed, the Osborn Transportation court acknowledged that Provincial
House might not be distinguishable on its facts, 10 7 but nevertheless
concluded that "the agent's conduct in this case did not violate the
neutrality rule announced in Athbro and did not require the Board to
set aside the election."'10 8
Of ProvincialHouse and Osborn Transportation, the former decision
was clearly the better reasoned. Fraternization does not occur in a
vacuum; it can take place during a purely "social" exchange or during the investigation of unfair labor practice charges. The Osborn
Transportationcourt erred by implying that fraternization may be acceptable as long as it takes place within the framework of an "official
investigation." In fact, such fraternization may be even more damaging to the Board's aura of neutrality because it involves social intimacy that is closely intertwined with the Board's official business.
Furthermore, the discrepancy between the Sixth Circuit's stand in
ProvincialHouse and the Fifth Circuit's approach in Osborn Transportation is regrettable on both normative and practical grounds. As a
normative matter, one would hope that the Board and circuit courts
could agree on a consistent, principled basis for assessing a Board
agent's conduct. Otherwise, employees, employers, unions, and the
public are confronted with a garbled and contradictory message
concerning the ethical standards to be applied in representation
elections. 10 9 And as a practical matter, this conflict among the cir107. The court stated:
Although in Provincial House the Board agent conducted his investigation
only ten days before the election and in the context of a union
organizational meeting, we are not certain that the differences in time
and place presented in our case would lead the ProvincialHouse court to a
different result.
id. at 1281.
108. Id.
109. As Charles Nesson has emphasized, "the projection and affirmation of norms
embodied in substantive law are central functions of the judicial process ....
" Nesson,
The Evidence or the Event? On JudicialProofand the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV.

1357, 1390 (1985). The same holds true, of course, for the Board's administrative
adjudicatory process. The competing and conflicting messages transmitted by the
courts and Board preclude these tribunals from projecting a coherent normative vision
with regard to assuring the integrity of representation elections.
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cuits could lead to forum shopping in which parties direct their appeals toward whatever circuit seems to favor their particular
0 Moreover,
position. "1
the conflicting resolutions reached by appellate courts leave the Board with little guidance on how to address
similar issues in subsequent cases. It is common to criticize the
Board for its repeated nonacquiescence toward appellate court rulings," I' but to which court should the Board defer when the circuits
are riddled with conflict?" 2 These inconsistencies among the
Board's own opinions, among the Board and the courts, and among
various circuits create grave uncertainties over the applicable standards, dilute the normative impact of decisions, encourage forum
shopping, and aggravate the problem of Board nonacquiescence.
In sum, the entire problem of fraternization has been treated by
the Board and the courts in an inconsistent manner. Athbro notwithstanding, the Board has been loath to invalidate elections based on
fraternization despite the appearance of partiality it may have conveyed to the parties, the employees, and the public. Ironically, it
frequently has been left to the circuit courts to uphold the Board's
earlier concern for maintaining the integrity of the Board's election
standards. Even the appellate court opinions, however, are marked
both by intra-circuit divisions (as in the Fifth Circuit's different approaches in Delta Drilling and Osborn Transportation) and inter-circuit
conflict (as between Osborn Transportation and the Sixth Circuit's resolution of ProvincialHouse).
B.

The Problem of Delegation

In addition to fraternizing with a party to a representation election, Board agents may impermissibly convey the appearance of favoritism by delegating certain official tasks to a representative of
either the employer or the union. As explained below, the inconsistencies that plague Board members and judges concerning fraterni110. See Estre'icher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence by FederalAdministrative Agencies, 98 YALE
L.J. 679, 705-12 (1989), and the sources cited therein for a discussion of the broad
venue provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1982). As Estreicher and Revesz explain,
"[w]hen an N.L.R.B. order renders both the union (or employee) and the employer
Iaggrieved,' it is possible for petitions to be filed in three different circuits-setting in
motion a 'race to the courthouse' that is only partially mitigated by recent legislation."
Estreicher & Revesz, supra, at 706 (footnote omitted).
111. See, e.g., Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 110 (discussing such criticism); Kafker,
Nonacquiescence by the NLRB: Combat Versus Collaboration,3 LAB. LAW. 137 (1987); Mattson,
The United States Circuit Courts and the NLRB: "Stare Decisis " Only Applies ifthe Agency Wins,
53 OKLA. Bj. 2561 (1982), for detailed criticism of the Board's recurring
nonacquiescence in circuit court opinions.
112. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 110, at 709-10 for a concise discussion of this
predicament.
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zation are mirrored in the difficulties they have encountered in
deciding whether the delegation in a particular case has tarnished
the Board's election standards. These difficulties have led to seemingly inconsistent opinions and raise additional questions concerning the standards the Board and courts will apply to preserve both
actual and apparent Board neutrality.
In Hotel Equities, 113 for example, the Board overruled an employer's objection that the agent conducting the balloting had
wrongfully permitted a union observer to translate voting instructions for Spanish-speaking employees. As the trial examiner explained, the employer argued "forcefully" that "the first admonition
in the Board's 'Instructions to Election Observers' is that an observer should not 'give help to any voter. Only an agent of the
Board can assist the voter.' "114 Nevertheless, the trial examiner
overruled this objection, stating:
[T]he record is not clear as to whether the Board agent was
sufficiently conversant in Spanish to have explained the ballot.
Had she been, it would seem clearly improper for her to have
allowed an observer for one of the parties to have assisted the
voter in this manner, in the absence of an interpreter for the
other party. On the other hand, if she was not sufficiently conversant the disallowance of observer assistance would effec15
tively result in the loss of an employee's right to vote.'
The trial examiner then decided that the Board agent should be
given the benefit of the doubt:
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, I believe the presumption of regularity prevails here, and that the Board agent
would not have delegated the authority to instruct the voter
had she been able to effectively do it herself. Since the instruction does not appear to be improper, I cannot agree that
the Board agent's conduct on this occasion warrants setting
the election aside."16
This determination was then approved by the Board on the
grounds that "[t]here was no proof of electioneering," ' " 7 but one
can question whether this conclusion is convincing. It is true, as the
trial examiner emphasized, that the union observer who acted as
translator specifically denied having urged the employee to vote for
the union." 8 Nevertheless, one is left with a nagging sense of un113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

180 N.L.R.B. 489 (1969).
Id. at 498 (footnote omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 490.
Id. at 498.
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certainty as to the propriety of this translation. The Board agent
had told the translator, "I speak a little Spanish so go ahead and
explain [how to vote]," " 9 which suggests that she could monitor the
translation to assure that no electioneering occurred. On the other
hand, if she was not sufficiently fluent to give the instructions herself, how can we be confident that she was capable of closely following the translation? These doubts are aggravated by her failure to
testify at the hearing and her apparent rudeness and emotional state
throughout the election process.' 20 Furthermore, why wasn't the
Board apprised of the possibility that not all employees would understand English? Then, the Board could have provided a bilingual
agent or at least assured that both the employer and the union had
observers present to translate. These concerns were not addressed
by the Board and one leaves the Hotel Equities decision with doubts
whether the Board adequately maintained its appearance of integ2
rity and impartiality.' '
A translation controversy arose again in Alco Iron & Metal Co., 122
but this time with diametrically opposite results. In Alco, the Board
agent relied upon a Spanish-speaking union observer to give voting
instructions to the predominantly Hispanic workforce because
neither the agent nor the employer's observer was bilingual.
Although the employer objected, the hearing officer ruled that such
translation was necessary and proper and that there was no indication that the translator had done more than explain voting procedures.' 2 3 The Board overruled his decision, however, emphasizing
that "the commission of an act by a Board agent conducting an election which tends to destroy confidence in the Board's election process, or which could reasonably be interpreted as impugning the
election standards we seek to maintain, is a sufficient basis for setting aside that election."' 24 The Board then explained:
119. Id.
120. Id. at 499-500 & n.51.
121. See also Sioux Prods. v. NLRB, 703 F.2d 1010 (7th Cir. 1983), denying enforcement
on other grounds to 258 N.L.R.B. 287 (1981), where the court affirmed the Board's
conclusion that an agent did not impermissibly prejudice the election by allowing union
representatives to help her translate instructions into Spanish, by rudely telling an
employer representative to "shut up" when he interrupted that translation to add
clarification, by bungling an attempt to translate instructions into Italian, and allegedly

engaging in other acts of misconduct. The court denied enforcement of the Board's
order, however, because it concluded that the Board had improperly invalidated a
ballot.
122. 269 N.L.R.B. 590 (1984).

123. Id. at 591.
124. Id. (citing Glacier Packing Co., 210 N.L.R.B. 571 (1974), discussed infra text
accompanying notes 186-192). Interestingly, the Board did not cite Athbro despite its
essentially identical language.
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[W]hen the first Spanish-speaking employee came to vote, the
Board agent merely instructed the Union's observer, Diaz, to
"translate the procedure of voting to these employees." The
Board agent provided no additional instruction or guidance,
and did not participate further in the conduct of the election,
except for handing ballots to employees, until the Employer's
observer complained. Even after this complaint, the Board
agent merely instructed the union observer to repeat the instructions in Spanish. Under these circumstances, we find the
atmosphere of impartiality in which the election should have
been held was not present. The delegation of an important
part of the election process to the [union's] observer conveyed
the impression that the [union], and not the Board, was responsible for running the election. Such conduct is incompatible with our responsibility for assuring properly conducted
elections and, accordingly, we hereby sustain the Employer's
1 25
objections, and direct that a second election be conducted.
This reasoning seems directly at odds with the rationale of Hotel
Equities, for how can the delegation of voting instruction duties be
acceptable pragmatism in one case and yet a fatal flaw in the next?
Moreover, the Alco Board's attempt to distinguish Hotel Equities is far
from convincing. The Board argued that its earlier decision was distinguishable because in that case the employer's observer had not
objected to the delegation, there was no proof of sub rosa electioneering, and the translation "involved only one employee and could
not have affected the outcome of the election."' 12 6 These distinctions, however, pale upon further scrutiny. First, the employer's observer in Alco did not object to the delegation per se; instead, he
complained only when he felt that the conversations in Spanish were
too lengthy.' 27 Second, there was no proof in either case that the
union observer engaged in electioneering under the guise of translating. 128 Finally, the Alco Board's retreat into outcome-determinism-that the translating in Hotel Equities could not have affected the
election's results-ran afoul of its own declaration that Board agent
misconduct "which tends to destroy confidence in the Board's election process, or which could reasonably be interpreted as impugning the election standards we seek to maintain, is a sufficient
125. Id. at 591-92 (footnotes omitted).
126. Id. at 591 n.2.
127. Id. at 591.
128. Id. As the Alco Board itself acknowledged, the hearing officer concluded that
"even if [the union observer's] explanations may have been lengthy and too verbose,
there was no indication that he did anything more than explain voting procedures to
employees who might not otherwise have been able to exercise their rights." Id.
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basis for setting aside that election." 129 The Board, therefore, failed
to offer a single compelling reason to justify the deep inconsistency
30
between its two decisions.
A different kind of delegation problem arose in NLRB v. Michigan
Rubber Products,131 where the employer objected that the Board
agent appeared to give the union control of the balloting by stationing a union observer at the entrance to the polling area and instructing him to admit employees into the area one at a time. The
Board overruled this objection, however, and the Sixth Circuit
agreed:
There is evidence that it was necessary to have someone control the flow of traffic in order to avoid congestion, because
there was only one door in and out of the [polling area]. At
the same time, a company observer stationed himself by the
ballot box, which negated any suggestion of partiality towards
the union. The Board was justified in concluding that the
placement of these observers had no impact on the votes cast
32
in the election. '
The employer also argued that this case involved the type of fraternization forbidden by Athbro and ProvincialHouse because a union
representative assisted the female Board agent by carrying the metal
voting booth back to her car after the morning polling session. The
court rejected that analogy, however, stating:
[W]hile it may have been imprudent of the Board agent to allow the union representative to assist her, this action could not
have had any effect on the outcome of the election. A Board
agent having a beer with a union representative presents an
entirely different situation than that of a female Board agent
129. See supra text accompanying note 124.
130. Furthermore, as Board member Hunter noted in his concurring opinion in Alco,
the Board failed to provide guidance on how representation elections should be
conducted when language difficulties arise. For that reason, Hunter proposed:
[W]here a Regional Office is on notice that a substantial percentage of
the electorate do not speak English, the Board must attempt to fulfill its
responsibility to protect the integrity of the election process by supplying
a Board agent or Regional Office authorized or otherwise approved
interpreter, capable of speaking the language of those employees so far
as the particular circumstances permit.
Id. at 592 (concurring opinion).
Indeed, this was not the first time that the Board received criticism for its inattention
toward language barriers in elections. In Marriott In-Flite Servs. Div. of Marriott Corp.
v. NLRB, 417 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1969), denying enforcement to 171 N.L.R.B. 742 (1968), for
example, the court applied Athbro and set aside a Board order because the Board had
failed to follow its policy of providing foreign language ballots where a substantial
number of voting employees did not understand English.
131. 738 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1984) (per curiam), enforcing 251 N.L.R.B. 74 (1980).
132. 738 F.2d at 114.'
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allowing a male union representative to help her by carrying a
polling booth. The first situation would certainly imply to the
observer that there was some social or business bond between
the participants, while the latter situation could be based en33
tirely on practical, physical logistics.'
As Michigan Rubber demonstrates, the Board and courts are reluctant to invalidate elections simply because an agent delegated minor
tasks to a representative of management or labor. In US Ecology, Inc.
v. NLRB, 134 for example, the Board and the Ninth Circuit overruled
the employer's objections that the agent permitted a union observer
to read the poll opening announcement and to help usher employees into the voting area. The Ninth Circuit explained:
[T]he Board agent's request for assistance in ushering employees into the room constituted delegation of a minor task
based on objective considerations (the Union observer was
closest to the door), and therefore did not impair her appearance of neutrality. Similarly, the Union observer's request that
each voter state his name as he entered the voting area was
proper and did not represent an abrogation of the Board
agent's control over the election. Finally, the Board agent's
choice of the Union observer to read the poll opening announcement was made after a neutral coin toss, the company
observer stood by the Union observer's side as he read the
announcement, and the content of the announcement had
been agreed on by all the parties. This neutral method of delegating a minor task also did not impair the Board's appear35
ance of neutrality.'
In support of its reasoning, the court relied on NLRB v. ARA Services, Inc. 136 In ARA, the Third Circuit enforced the Board's bargaining order on the grounds that it was not unreasonable for the Board
agent to allow a union observer to ask the names of employees as
they came to vote. As the court explained, "it is proper, and even
necessary, for observers not personally acquainted with every member of the bargaining unit to require identification."' 3 7 Furthermore, the US Ecology court correctly relied upon 29 C.F.R.
133. Id. at 115. The court also concluded that "[t]he Board agent's allowing the
union representative to carry the polling booth hardly rises to the same level as the
situation in ProvincialHouse." Id. See also Queen City Foundry, 73 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1345,
1348 (1970) (holding that union representative's friendly offer to help Board agent erect
voting booth did not prejudice the election).
134. 772 F.2d 1478 (9th Cir.), enforcing 274 N.L.R.B. No. 58 (1985) (unpublished
opinion).
135. 772 F.2d at 1483 (citation omitted).
136. 717 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1983) (en banc), enforcing 251 N.L.R.B. 55 (1980).
137. 717 F.2d at 68.
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§ 101.19(a)(2), which provides that "[a]ppropriate representatives
of each party may assist [the Board agents] and observe the election." 3 8 Certainly elections should not be set aside whenever an
agent delegates minor tasks to facilitate the voting, as long as he
"take[s] care not to turn over control of the election to an observer"
and assures that the election is "conducted in a manner which in1 39
spires confidence in the impartiality of the Board and its agents."'
Nonetheless, there is one troublesome aspect to US Ecology,
namely that the employer's attorney objected to an observer for
either party reading the voting announcement and agreed to the
40
coin toss only because the Board agent would not read it herself. 1
The attorney reasonably might have believed that prejudice could
arise unless the Board agent personally read the announcement and
agreed to flip a coin only because the agent failed to recognize this.
A similar problem arose recently in San Francisco Sausage Co., 141
where a divided Board upheld an election over the union's objection
that the agent improperly permitted the employer to summon voters over its intercom system. Relying on US Ecology, the Board ma42
jority ruled that this was a harmless "delegation of a minor task." 1
In contrast, Board member Johansen argued:
The parties clearly and specifically agreed prior to the election that the Board agent would use the plant intercom system
to notify the employees that it was time to vote. Contrary to
this specific agreement, the Board agent, for reasons best
known to her, allowed the Petitioner [employer] . . . to summon the voters via the intercom. The employees, hearing the
Petitioner's voice making the announcement that it was time
to vote, could easily have concluded that the Petitioner, not
143
the Board agent, was really running the election.
Johansen's dissent has definite force. First, one questions
whether a Board agent should be permitted to break a preelection
agreement and arbitrarily delegate the duty of announcing the
opening of the polls. Second, even in the absence of such an agreement, permitting either side to read the announcement seems a
poor practice. AsJohansen realized, employees might well misinterpret this as a sign that either the union or the employer is "running"
the election in place of the Board. Unless such delegation is truly
necessary in a given election because of competing demands on the
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

772 F.2d at 1482-83 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 101.19(a)(2) (1985)).
Id. at 1483 (citing Alco Iron & Metal Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 590 (1984)).
Id. at 1482.
291 N.L.R.B. No. 64 (October 19, 1988).
Id.
Id. (dissenting opinion).

942

CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

agent's time, one would hope that the Board would ban this practice
because of its potentially misleading nature.
In essence, the Board's infidelity toward the Athbro standard is as
pervasive on delegation issues as it is with the problem of fraternization. In virtually every case where the issue has arisen, the Board
has ignored or minimized the prejudicial effect the delegation may
have entailed and the circuit courts have accepted this. The lone
significant exception is Alco, 144 where the Board relied upon Glacier
Packing Co. 145
C.

The Problem of Allegedly PartisanStatements or Actions

Perhaps the most obvious manner in which a Board agent may
undermine the Board's aura of neutrality is by making statements or
engaging in acts that imply favoritism toward a particular party to
the election. While a statement that "I want the union (or employer) to win" would be the most flagrant example of this, many
other actions or comments have been objected to for allegedly suggesting bias. As demonstrated below, however, the Board's efforts
to address this problem in a clear and consistent manner have suffered from the same flaws discussed earlier in this Article.
The Board has been particularly slow to find suggestions of partisanship simply because a Board agent relates her prior experiences
representing management or labor. In Shorewood Manor Nursing
Home & Rehabilitation Center, 146 for example, the employer alleged
that the Board agent told the employer's election observer that he
had received his position with the Board because he previously had
been a union steward, and that the observer then repeated this to
employees who had not yet voted. Purporting to apply Athbro, the
hearing officer concluded that this "did not compromise the Board's
standards" and the Board affirmed this determination. 4 7 The
Board also overruled the employer's objection that the male Board
agent had tainted the election by playfully inviting a female clerical
144. Alco Iron & Metal Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 590 (1984), discussed supra notes 122-30
and accompanying text.
145. 210 N.L.R.B. 571 (1974). For a discussion of Glacier Packing, see infra notes 18692 and accompanying text.
146. 217 N.L.R.B. 1106, 1107-08 (1975).
147. Id. The hearing officer discredited testimony by the employer's election
observers that she related the Board agent's remarks to several elibigle voting unit
employees who had not yet cast their ballots. Even if the hearing offlicer's decision to
discredit such testimony was correct, that would not change the fact that the Board
agent did make the potentially prejudicial statement and that employees later learned of
it. Even if the employees' knowledge of the statement occurred after they voted, they
still could have been left with the lingering impression that the Board and union were
united against the employer.
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worker of the Board to sit on a bed with him in the presence of two
election observers. The Board explained:
In the midst of a "lot ofjoking,"... [the Board agent] invited
the clerical to sit on the bed. This is all there is to the incident.
Nobody suggests that anything more or different happened.
We therefore perceive no need for a hearing to inquire further
into the matter nor any reason for believing that the incident
could have had any effect on the voters or the election or the
1 48
sanctity of the Board's processes.
The Board's reasoning (or lack thereof) is troublesome with regard to both objections. First, the agent's comment that he received
his position because of his union background obviously could have
conveyed the impression that he supported labor organizations, including the union seeking representation in that case. This is not to
argue that the Board should refrain from hiring people with backgrounds in labor relations; such experience can be extremely useful
whether that background be pro-management or pro-labor. A far
different issue is presented, however, when a Board agent states that
he won his job because of his specific previous alliance with either
unions or management. Rather than transmitting the message that
he was hired because of his prior knowledge, it sends the signal that
he was hired because of his previous affiliation. 149 The Board failed
to appreciate this difference, however, and it did not even note the
hearing officer's reliance on (or misapplication of) the Athbro
doctrine.
Second, one is perturbed by the Board's glossing over of the
agent's sexual innuendo toward the female clerical. While such joking may not have connoted a lack of impartiality, it certainly demon148. Id. at 1107.
149. Many scholars have commented on the intractable problem that governments
inevitably must rely on agents drawn from the midst of society's competing political and
socioeconomic forces. Roberto Unger, for example, asserts:
Only an entity that somehow stands above the conflicting groups can
both limit the power of all the groups and pretend to the posture of
impartiality, impersonality, or providential harmony which sanctions its
claim to their allegiance. At the same time, the state must reinforce the
relationships of domination and dependence, and the persons who man
its agencies must necessarily come from particular ranks. All the basic
conflicts that mark the history of the contrast of state and society derive
in the end from the paradox implicit in this situation. The state, which is
the child of the social hierarchy, must also be its ruler; it must be distinct
from any one social group in the system of domination and dependence.
Yet it has to draw its staff and its purposes from groups that are part of
this system. Whenever either side of the paradox is forgotten, the true
relationship between state and society is obscured.
R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 60-61 (1976).
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strated a lack of integrity and respect for the sanctity of election
procedures. As Board member Kennedy argued in dissent, such
misconduct should have been considered in "determining whether
the totality of the Board agents' conduct met the standards that the
Board expects of its Board agents . ... " 150 Indeed, even the Board

majority seemed to recognize that such sexism could impair its reputation, for it emphasized in a footnote that the mischievous agent
was only a work-study student and was no longer employed by the
Board. 151
The Shorewood Board's lack of concern over an agent's declaration
of prior union connections was replicated in Magic Pan, Inc. v.
NLRB, 152 where the Seventh Circuit enforced the Board's order
overruling an employer's objections. In Magic Pan, the Board agent
casually' informed a union observer that he previously had worked
for a legal clinic which had handled workers' compensation matters
for a union local affiliated with the labor organization involved in
that election. The court concluded that the employer's claim of bias
was "frivolous" because:
[The Board agent] testified that he did not think his remarks
could be interpreted as either pro-union generally or proACTWU, the union involved in the election. Furthermore, all
witnesses agree that no voter was present during this conversation, and all the observers had already
voted, so the remarks
15
could not have affected the outcome. 3
This rationalization is troublesome in several respects. First, the
court's focus is misplaced, for the proper question is not whether
the Board agent thought his remarks indicated pro-union bias but
whether employees could have construed them as such.' 5 4 While
the Board agent's perception of how his remarks could be interpreted is relevant, it hardly is dispositive of this issue. Furthermore,
the court erred in emphasizing that these remarks were made after
the polling was completed and therefore could not have affected the
election's outcome. As the Board emphasized in Athbro, outcomedeterminism is "not... the only test to apply."' 5 5 Finally, the court
150. Shorewood, 217 N.L.R.B. at 1107 n.5 (Kennedy, dissenting).
151. Id. at 1107 n.3.
152. 627 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), enforcing 244 N.L.R.B. 630 (1979).
153. 627 F.2d at 109.
'154. See, e.g., NLRB v. State Plating & Finishing Co., 738 F.2d 733, 739 n.5 (6th Cir.
1984) (stating that "[i]mpairment of Board neutrality is dependent on the employee's
perception of the Board agent's comments, not on who is to blame for that
perception"), denying enforcement to 262 N.L.R.B. 132 (1982). State Plating is discussed
infra at notes 207-17 and accompanying text.
155. 166 N.L.R.B. 966, 966 (1967).
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failed to ask, much less resolve, the deeper question of whether the
agent's communication of his prior union-related experiences could
have undermined the Board's appearance of impartiality. In fact,
the Board and the Seventh Circuit did not even mention Athbro in
their opinions.
The Board and courts frequently have been slow to move, moreover, even when the suggestion of bias seems far more direct. In
NLRB v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 156 for example, the Fifth Circuit enforced
the Board's bargaining order despite the employer's objection that
the agent made statements plainly indicating favoritism toward the
union. In particular, the employer complained that the Board agent
had told union and management observers that the union represented about twenty bargaining units, that he believed the union
would win that election, and that "it would do the people a lot of
57
good." 1
The regional director overruled these objections on the grounds
that the comments did not actually cause prejudice in the voting.
Although his decision was rendered before the Board decided Athbro, it was affirmed by the Board after that landmark case had been
decided. As the Fifth Circuit explained, however, the Board did not
even refer to the Athbro decision. Nonetheless, the court stated:
The Board did not refer to Athbro nor did it articulate the
rationale for its holding on the question of the agent's misconduct. We are confident, however, that the Board did consider
the issue. The employer's objections to the Regional Director's determinations, made in his brief to the board, raised the
issue of the integrity of the election process, although not explicitly referring to Athbro. Again in its brief seeking a rehearing, the employer raised the same issue explicitly claiming a
departure from established board policy, although without citing Athbro. 158
Such reasoning sounds contrived and inherently implausible.
How could the court assume that the Board impliedly considered its
recent holding in Athbro when that opinion was cited neither by the
Board nor by the employer? Although the court emphasized that
the employer voiced its concern for the integrity of election standards, that is not equivalent to concluding that the Board actually
weighed the evidence in light of Athbro and reached a decision in
accordance with its holding. Despite this glaring omission to apply
or distinguish such a recent, relevant, and potentially far-sweeping
156. 435 F.2d 704 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam), enforcing 172 N.L.R.B. 1781 (1968).
157. 435 F.2d at 705.

158. Id.
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opinion, the court took a leap of faith to assume that the Board's
cursory opinion impliedly embodied or reflected a meaningful analysis of the Athbro principle.
Perhaps sensing the weakness of its first line of reasoning, the
Fifth Circuit then sought to demonstrate that Athbro was in fact distinguishable from the case at bar. The court asserted:
The Board could reasonably distinguish this case ....

[Tihe

Agent's improper actions were not as public as those in Athbro.
Additionally, it would be reasonable to distinguish between
acts of fraternization and expressions of personal feelings to
limited audiences. The former smacks much more of irregularity than the latter. Finally, the Board agent's improper
statements were not part of a proselytizing effort on his part or
even a simple unprovoked indiscretion. It was the questions
of the Employer's own observer that elicited the Agent's statements. An employer cannot through his agent lead the Board
agent to make improper statements and then rely on such
statements to void the election without a showing of
prejudice. 159

This second line of support, however, is as permeable as the first.
First, its factual distinction between the two cases is specious, for the
fraternization in Athbro was, if anything, less "public" than the
agent's comments in Dobbs Houses. Whereas the former involved
beer drinking far removed from the polls which was witnessed by
only a single employee who already had voted, the latter involved
statements made during balloting to at least two observers. 160 Sec159. Id. at 705-06 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted).
160. With regard to the publicity element, the Dobbs court also needed to distinguish
its earlier opinion in Delta Drilling Co. v. NLRB, 406 F.2d 109 (5th Cir. 1969), denying
enforcement to 169 N.L.R.B. 617 (1968), discussed supra at notes 95-100 and
accompanying text. The court attempted to do so as follows:
This Court's decision in [Delta Drilling] determined that a Board Agent's
activities did not live up to the Athbro standard of propriety. It rejected
the Board's argument that the amount of publicity of the impropriety to
the voting members of the unit was a relevant criterion for limiting the
rule. In that case, though, the Board itself had not acted on the merits of
the case, relying on an agreement between the parties that the Regional
Director's decision would be final. Where the Board does act, it should
be accorded reasonable latitude in limiting its own rules.
435 F.2d at 705 n.1.
This distinction, although hardly specious, is ultimately dissatisfying. While the
Board's decisions may be entitled to more "latitude" than those of a regional director,
the Fifth Circuit should not have permitted the Board to curtail Athbro's reach without
any explicit and well-reasoned analysis as to why it was doing so. Rather than an exercise in judicial tyranny, it is a prudent and commonly accepted practice for courts to
insist, at a minimum, that the Board and other administrative bodies explain their departures from their own rules and standards. Indeed, as the Fifth Circuit itself later stressed
in NLRB v. Osborn Transportation, Inc.:
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ond, it is difficult to see how statements of bias-which cut directly
at the Board's appearance of impartiality-are less offensive than
fraternization, which conceivably could involve nothing more than
6
social acquaintance unaccompanied by professional prejudice.' '
Third, by the court's own admission the agent's statements were
"improper." Given that impropriety, how could one justify not defending the integrity of the election? The best the court could do
was to blame the employer's observer for asking questions that
prompted the improper remarks. One may agree wholeheartedly
with the court that private parties should not be permitted to "entrap" the Board into election-nullifying statements, but neither the
Board nor the court referred to any evidence suggesting that such
entrapment actually took place. To the contrary, we are told simply
that the employer's observer asked unspecified questions. Moreover, even assuming arguendo that such inquiries carried the secret
motive of leading the agent into error, the agent simply could have
62
refused to answer them.'
Ironically, the court's opinion in Dobbs Houses seems both too deferential toward the Board and too eager to impose its own standards for judging elections. The opinion is too deferential insofar
as it enforces an opinion devoid of any persuasive reasoning on how
to assure that the Board's standards of integrity and neutrality are
preserved. The opinion apparently seeks to limit the Board's prerogatives in future cases, however, by stating that a party must make
"a showing of prejudice" when the actions of its representative allegedly induced Board agent misconduct. While that conclusion has
We emphasize ...

that in exercising the discretion entrusted it in rep-

resentation matters, the Board must faithfully adhere to the policies and
procedures previously announced in its rules and decisions. "Such policies are controlling until the Board announces a change and its reasons
for the change." Delta Drilling Co. v. N.L.R.B., 406 F.2d 109, 113 (5th Cir.
1969); Rayonier, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 380 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1967).

Osborn Transportation,589 F.2d 1275, 1279 (5th Cir. 1979), discussed supra at notes 10108 and accompanying text.
161. As one commentator has observed:
[An employer] is confronted, on the one hand, by an agent who indicated
he had prounion sentiments, and on the other hand, by an agent who
drank beer with a union representative or who briefly stopped in at the
representative's motel room. Either of these situations is serious enough
to raise an inference of partiality on the part of the agent and probably
casts a shadow of doubt over the integrity of the election itself. While the
latter two acts of misconduct are suspicious, the former is almost selfindicting.
WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 423.
162. Williams, unfortunately, succumbs to the court's excuse mongering on this issue,
concluding that "[o]nly on this ground is Dobbs Houses, Inc. distinguishable from the
Athbro rationale." Id.
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a certain commonsensical appeal, one can question whether the
court was justified in attempting to impose a new standard that the
Board apparently never had considered. The Board might agree on
such a solution, but the court's eagerness to lay down this standard
seems at odds with its passivity in assuming that the Board had engaged in a sub silentio analysis and application of the Athbro
principle.
In any event, the Board has remained skeptical toward objections
based on the allegedly biased behavior of its agents. In Hotel
Equities,163 for example, the Board remained unconvinced that the
election had been tarnished despite a litany of objections by the employer. The employer alleged:
During the polling period and in the presence of voting employees and election observers a Board agent conducted herself in a highly improper manner by making loud, rude,
abusive and threatening statements and comments to election
observers and other persons in the voting area and by other
threats and improper conduct created an atmosphere of fear
and confusion and thereby destroyed the necessary laboratory
atmosphere. Because of the threatening nature of such conduct a large number of employees refrained from visiting the
1 64
polling place for the purpose of casting their ballots.
These charges were not only dramatic; they also appeared to be
substantially justified for the employer introduced a plethora of testimony concerning the agent's misconduct. First, witnesses for both
the employer and the union stated that the agent engaged in a testy
exchange with a non-employee who had wandered into the voting
area.1 6 5 Second, three of the employer's election observers testified
that the agent abrasively supervised their conduct during the election.' 66 Third, the agent allegedly ordered a black employee to
"come back here gal" when she did not push her ballot sufficiently
deep into the ballot box.' 6 7 And fourth, an additional witness testified that she had complained to another Board agent that the cantankerous one had "been ranting and raving and screaming all
68
afternoon." 1
Taken together, such testimony would seem to constitute damning evidence that the Board agent had acted in a woefully unprofes163. 180 N.L.R.B. 489, 489-90 (1969).

notes 113-21 and accompanying text.
164. 180 N.L.R.B. at 499.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.

For further discussion of this case, see supra
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sional manner, engaged in condescending behavior toward a black
employee (which could have discouraged other workers from voting), insulted the employer's election observers (which could have
instilled a reasonable belief among employees that the Board disapproved of the employer), and alienated a member of the general
public (upon whose faith and taxes the Board ultimately must depend). Despite this parade of horribles, the trial examiner overruled the employer's objections in a decision adopted in all relevant
respects by the Board.
First, the trial examiner discounted the testimony of the woman
who alleged that the Board agent had been "ranting and raving and
screaming" even though neither that agent nor the one who initially
heard the complaint testified at the hearing. As the trial examiner
rationalized:
while I agree with the contention of the Employer that since
neither [of the Board agents] were called as witnesses, I
should assume the truthfulness of the Employer's witnesses on
this point, I cannot close my eyes to the fact that [the woman
testifying] impressed me as being a rather highly charged and
emotional person who might very well utilize hyperbole in
69
describing the characteristics of others.'
Such reasoning is highly suspect. Without questioning the trial examiner's opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and
base credibility judgments thereon, it seems curious that he would
discredit the observer's statement as an emotional exaggeration
when no Board agent came forward to rebut her testimony.
The trial examiner then made the equally dubious decision to
cripple the employer's ability to present evidence regarding the effect of the Board agent's behavior on the potential voters. He justified this restriction by arguing that he "merely limited testimony of
witnesses to statements they may have made to other prospective
voters. Testimony sought to be elicited from witnesses respecting
rumors or statements of employees made outside the voting area to
the witness was sustained [sic, presumably excluded] as being the
rankest form of hearsay."' 70
This justification is questionable at best. First, it misapplies the
hearsay rule by failing to consider the purpose for which the testimony was to be introduced. "Hearsay" is commonly defined as "a
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
169. Id. at 499 n.51.
170. Id. at 500 n.52.
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matter asserted."' 7' The employer, in contrast, was not necessarily
seeking to introduce such testimony to "prove" that the Board
agent actually was ranting and raving; it was sufficient for it to introduce testimony establishing that employees believed that she was
ranting and raving and that this belief discouraged them from voting, prompted them to vote for the union, or undermined faith in
the Board's professional neutrality. 7 2 The trial examiner, however,
171. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 801. See also C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 246 (3d ed. E. Cleary 1984). For an insightful critique of traditional hearsay
doctrine, see Note, The Theoretical Foundation of the Hearsay Rules, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1786
(1980).
The Board has decided it will not strictly apply the hearsay rule in its proceedings.
For example, in Alvin J. Bart & Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 242 (1978), enforcement denied on other
grounds, 598 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir. 1979), the Board refused to adopt a per se rule
automatically excluding hearsay. The Board explained that:
If this case involved solely the question of the admissibility of hearsay
in Board proceedings, which it does not, we would be reluctant to adopt a
rule which mechanically excludes evidence, regardless of its intrinsic
reliability, because it is technically hearsay. Administrative agencies
ordinarily do not invoke a technical rule of exclusion but admit hearsay
evidence and give it such weight as its inherent quality justifies. In
Richardson v. Perales, the Supreme Court held that reports, which were
clearly hearsay in character, by themselves constituted substantial
evidence sufficient to support an administrative finding. The Court made
clear that although "hearsay in the technical sense ...

would be deemed

formally inadmissible in judicial proceedings," it would not reject
"administrative reliance on hearsay irrespective of reliability and
probative value."
Bart, 236 N.L.R.B. at 242 (quoting Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 407 (1971)) (citations omitted).
The Bart Board also reasoned that the statements should not be excluded because
they arguably were not hearsay and no objection had been made to them at the hearing.
More generally, the Board reiterated that "the Board is not bound to follow the strict
rules of evidence applicable in the Federal Courts" even though Section 10(b) of the Act
requires that "so far as practicable" Board proceedings be conducted in accordance with
the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id.
Bart's message that the Board need not follow strictly the Federal Rules' approach to
hearsay has been noted in at least two subsequent Board opinions, Bohemia, Inc., 266
N.L.R.B. 761, 762 n. ll (1983), aff'd, 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3160 (11th Cir. 1985), and
United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers of America, Local 878, 255 N.L.R.B.
251, 251 n.l (1981). See also Eisenberg v. Honeycomb Plastics Corp., 125 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 3257, 3267 (D.N.J. 1987) (citing Bart on hearsay and stating: "It has long been
recognized that the Board is not bound to follow the strict rules of evidence").
172. The trial examiner also failed to consider the practical problems the employer
may have faced in finding employees to testify on its behalf. The union had received a
majority of the votes and bargaining unit employees may have been reluctant to incur
the wrath of their pro-union brethren by giving testimony that would jeopardize that
organization's victory. In light of that reluctance, the employer may have been forced to
rely on the secondhand statements which the trial examiner excluded from the hearing.
The unfortunate result is that the Board never had an opportunity to determine whether
its agent's misconduct had a chilling effect on any employee's right to vote, whether he
be pro-union or anti-union.

19901

BIAS IN LABOR ELECTIONS

rejected such potentially crucial testimony and settled for issuing a
rather meaningless admonition and rationalization:
In assessing the conduct of the Board agent in question, as
reflected by the evidence herein, it may be stated at the outset
that rudeness and impolite conduct on the part of Board
agents is not to be condoned. This is particularly true with
respect to those agents who work in the field offices of the
Board and who are in daily contact with the public. In the field
of labor law, highly charged as it is with the emotions of the
parties to the contest, the standards of conduct of a Board
agent are set extremely high. Clearly, conduct of a threatening or intimidatory nature which may reasonably be said to
thwart the right of an employee to cast his ballot in the election would be sufficient grounds for setting aside such election. However, while the conduct of Mrs. Reel (the Board
agent] may be legitimately criticized for being impolite, abrupt, and even abusive as respects her relationship with the
election observers and a member of the general public, I find,
contrary to the contentions of the Employer, no substantial evidence upon which I may draw an inference that eligible employees did not vote in the election because of fear of Mrs.
Reel. 173
In effect, therefore, the trial examiner applied a narrow outcomedeterminative test to decide whether the Board agent's abusive misconduct invalidated the election. However offensive such behavior
may have been, it was not deemed significant enough to require a
new election unless it made employees so fearful of casting ballots
that they forfeited their right to vote. And given the trial examiner's
refusal to admit further testimony concerning the alleged climate of
alienation, the employer could not make that requisite showing. As
a consequence, the trial examiner (with the Board's subsequent
blessing) merely wagged a disapproving finger at the Board agent
without moving to redress the harm she may have caused to the
workers' sense of dignity and freedom to vote.
The trial examiner justified this curious result on the grounds that
the Board agent was an equal opportunity tyrant, stating:
[T]here is no contention or evidence that Mrs. Reel's officious
attitude was directed at one particular person or party to the
election, and therefore could be characterized as partial or discriminatory. As Company Observer McDonald pointed out,
Mrs. Reel was not simply rude to the Company or Union, "she
was just plain rude." While ... rudeness and other such impo-

lite conduct on the part of a Board agent is certainly not to be
173. Hotel Equities, 180 N.L.R.B. at 500.
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condoned, the evidence in the record here considered as a
whole simply does not measure up, in my judgment, to the
allegation that it created "an atmosphere of fear and confusion and thereby destroyed the necessary laboratory atmosphere." .. . [N]o employee testified that he was deterred from
casting a ballot because of reports of intimidation emanating
from the polling area [n]or, indeed, was there any testimony of
observers or employees who had voted to other17employees
ad4
vising them against exercising their franchise.
This argument contains a certain logic: given that the Board
agent was rude to all, neither side could assert that she was biased
against its particular stance in the election. Such reasoning fails to
appreciate, however, that the agent's blanket hostility could have destroyed the employees' belief in the Board as an entity committed to
protecting their rights in the workplace. The Board ignored this potential problem, however, and adopted the trial examiner's rulings.
In an opinion lacking any reasoned analysis of the evidence, the
Board concluded that "even assuming, arguendo, that [the offensive
acts] occurred, we find that under the circumstances they did not
create an environment of tension or coercion such as to preclude
75
employees from exercising a free choice."
The Board also refused to invalidate an election because of an
agent's alleged partisanship in Wald Sound, Inc. 176 In this case the
Board's field examiner reportedly told two colleagues "that they
had gotten themselves a 'winner' " when their tally of the ballots
revealed that the union had received a majority of the votes but that
there were also numerous challenged ballots. 77 Based on this remark, which the employer viewed as "a partisan characterization
which clearly violates the principles expressed in Athbro," the employer argued that the election was invalid.' 78 The Board disagreed, however, stating:
While we view the Board agent's choice of language as unfortunate, and to be avoided, we agree with the Regional Director's finding that the language, viewed in context, simply
indicates that in the Board agent's view the new Board agents
who accompanied her were participating in an election
174. Id.
175. Id. at 490 (footnote omitted). See also Sioux Prods. Inc. v. NLRB, 703 F.2d 1010
(7th Cir. 1983), denying enforcement to 258 N.L.R.B. 287 (1981), where the court accepted
the Board's determination that an agent's alleged rudeness did not invalidate the
election but denied enforcement of the Board's bargaining order for other reasons.
176. 203 N.L.R.B. 366 (1973).
177. Id. at 367 (appendix to opinion).
178. Id.
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presenting unusual complications. Moreover, there is no way
in which her remark, made after the ballots
had been cast,
79
could have affected the election results.'
Board member Kennedy took issue with this reasoning in a dissent that relied heavily upon Athbro. Asserting that the agent's comment did "not inspire confidence in the impartiality of the Board's
election processes" and "was a departure from the standards which
the Board seeks to maintain," Kennedy concluded:
When unions and employers invest substantial time, effort,
and money in an organizational campaign, it is incumbent
upon the Board to conduct an election in a manner which inspires confidence in the impartiality and competence of the
Board and its agents. There is no function or mission of this agency
of greater importance than runningfair elections. 180
One could possibly agree with the substantive result reached by
the majority in Wald Sound while acknowledging that Kennedy's idealism is more in keeping with the spirit of Athbro. The majority's
basic reasoning-that the agent's "winner" remark was an innocuous comment on the balloting-may well be valid, for'it would serve
no purpose to permit parties to invalidate elections whenever they
can take an ambiguous remark out of context and claim that it demonstrates bias. The majority ignored the spirit of Athbro, however,
when it emphasized that the remark could not have affected the election's outcome. As Kennedy reasoned, the Athbro standard is
designed to preserve faith in the Board's standards of integrity, professional competence, and neutrality, not merely to assure that the
results are unadulterated. One is particularly disturbed by the fact
that the Board majority omitted any discussion of Athbro and utilized
reasoning that seems contrary to its principle. Moreover, that approach seems superfluous given that the majority rationally could
have concluded that the "winner" remark simply did not rise to the
level of apparent partisanship condemned by Athbro.
Wabash Transformer Corp. 181 reaffirmed the Board's refusal to set
aside elections based on ambiguous statements by its agents. Here
the Board agent failed to follow the Board's official language for
announcing the opening of the polls and instead stated that the employees could "now vote for your union representative," or words
to that effect.' 8 2 The employer argued that this announcement was
179. Id. at 366 n.I.
180. Id. at 367 (Kennedy, dissenting) (emphasis added).
181. 205 N.L.R.B. 148 (1973), bargainingorder issued, 210 N.L.R.B. 462 (1974), enforced,
509 F.2d 647 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975).
182. 205 N.L.R.B. at 148.
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prejudicial because it implied that the workers could not also choose
to vote against the union. In a split decision, however, the Board
ruled:
[W]e cannot agree that the mere statement of the Board agent
that the polls were open and the employees could, if they desired, "now vote for your union representative" is a sufficient
basis to set aside the election. Obviously, a Board election is
an election to select a union representative. While the Board
agent may have and should have made explicit what was implicit in the announcement, i.e., that the right to vote for the
union necessarily carried with it the right to vote against the
union, we do not believe that the agent's statement was per se
so violative of the Board's standards of neutrality or so prejudicial to the employees' right to cast a negative vote that a new
83
election must be directed.'
Relying on Athbro, Chairman Miller dissented:
It is undisputed that the Board agent identified herself as a
representative of this Board and then proceeded to announce
the opening of the polls in a manner which substantially departed from our official instructions to voters. My colleagues
are willing to excuse this particular deviation since in their
opinion the Board's preelection notices and the Employer's
campaign literature distributed to employees adequately neutralized any prejudicial effect the Board agent's statement may
have [had] on the prospective voters. I am unwilling to so
speculate, and am of the view that where a representative of
this Board, even unwittingly, fails to preserve not only the fact
of our neutrality, but also the appearance of neutrality, we
84
must rerun the election.'
The Eighth Circuit agreed with the Board majority on the
grounds that no evidence indicated that employees were misled by
the agent's statement, that there was no claim that the agent actually favored the union, and that under the circumstances "the ruling
that the questioned statement did not breach the neutrality of the
election procedures fell within the Board's discretionary powers."'' s5 In all probability, the Eighth Circuit was correct; the
agent's statement appears to have been nothing more than an innocent slip of the tongue and it would be wasteful to permit parties to
force rerun elections based on such trivial miscues. Once again,
however, one is troubled by the Board's paucity of analysis. Given
dissenting Chairman Miller's reliance on Athbro, the majority needed
183. Id.
184. Id. at 149 (dissenting opinion) (footnote omitted).
185. NLRB v. Wabash Transformer Corp., 509 F.2d 647, 648-49 (8th Cir. 1975).
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to explain why the statement did not impair the Board's standards
of integrity and impartiality. Instead, however, the Board once
again disregarded Athbro as irrelevant jurisprudential flotsam.
In a decision soon to follow, however, the Board reiterated the
concern for procedural integrity that had flourished in Athbro.
Although it curiously did not cite that precedent, Glacier Packing
Co. 186 took a carefully prophylactic approach toward improprieties
of a field agent that allegedly impaired the free choice of employees.
In that case, the Board agent confronted two of the employer's election observers, tore off their anti-union badges, and loudly chastised
them for wrongfully electioneering in the polling area. In addition,
the agent castigated the employer's director of personnel for distributing anti-union literature near the polling place, which precipitated an argument in which numerous employees sided with the
agent and jeered at the director of personnel. Based on these actions, the employer challenged the validity of the victory by one of
87
the two competing unions.
The Board's opinion is noteworthy, for it first emphasized that the
agent was correct in stopping the employer's electioneering. The
Board explained:
At the outset, we reject the Employer's argument that observers designated by the parties involved in Board-conducted
elections have a right to wear campaign material favoring one
of the choices on the ballot. Clearly the Board's instructions
to its agents conducting elections .

.

. are consistent with the

prohibition against electioneering at or near the polls. Board
agents conducting elections may therefore delineate an area
within which electioneering is prohibited; they must exercise
their judgment as to what constitutes electioneering activity;
and they are required to take reasonable measures to restrict
electioneering activity which comes to their attention, consistent with their other obligations.' 8 8
The Board then stressed, however, that its agents must always
preserve the appearance of neutrality:
Board agents in conducting elections on behalf of the Board
must endeavor to maintain and protect the integrity and neutrality of its procedures. Therefore, while taking all practicable measures to implement the prohibition against
electioneering at or near the polls, they must take care that
their actions do not tend to foster in the minds of the voters
186. 210 N.L.R.B. 571 (1974).

187. Id. at 571-72.
188. Id. at 573 (footnotes omitted).
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the impression that the Board is not neutral with regard to the
choices on the ballot. For, the Board's role in conducting
elections must not be open to question. Thus, actions by a
Board agent conducting an election, which could reasonably
be.interpreted as impugning the election standards we seek to
maintain, are sufficient grounds for setting aside the
election. ' 89
Applying this philosophy to the case at hand, the Board concluded that employees who witnessed the two incidents could have
interpreted the Board agent's remarks and actions as indicative of
the Board's opposition to the employer's position. Furthermore,
because the Board agent's conduct "may have had a substantial impact on the results of the election," the Board set aside the election
190
and ordered a new one.
On one level, Glacier appears to reject a focus on possible outcome-determinism in favor of a return toward the idealism of Athbro.
Upon closer inspection, however, the idealism is actually quite cautious. True, the Board's statement that "actions by a Board agent
conducting an election, which could reasonably be interpreted as
impugning the election standards we seek to maintain, are sufficient
grounds for setting aside the election,"'' plainly harks back to Athbro. The Board also emphasized, however, that the agent's misconduct in Glacier "may have had a substantial impact on the results of
the election,"' 9 2 which smacks of outcome-determinism. It therefore was left unclear whether the Glacier Board accepted the full import of Athbro that elections could be set aside due to the appearance
of partisanship regardless of the effect on the workers' voting
behavior.
Subsequent Board decisions have aggravated rather than resolved
this facial ambiguity in Glacier. In Abbott Laboratories v. NLRB, for
example, the Fourth Circuit held that there was "no error of fact or
law" in the Board's conclusion that allegedly improper remarks
were not prejudicial "since they were not made within the hearing of
anyone who had not yet voted, and were not so extreme .. .that
they destroyed the appearance of the Board's impartiality."'193 This
statement seemingly suggests that either actual voter prejudice in
the election or an impairment of the Board's perceived neutrality
would justify rerunning an election. In practice, however, the Board
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
540 F.2d 662, 665 n.1 (4th Cir. 1976), enforcing 217 N.L.R.B. 859 (1975).
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has remained reluctant to find that either condition exists. In NLRB
v. Michigan Rubber Products,194 the Sixth Circuit reviewed a Board decision that represented the converse of Glacier: the agent wrongfully
prohibited a form of acceptable electioneering (posting anti-union
cartoons) but did so in a manner that arguably did not suggest partisanship (because the agent ordered both the union's observer and
the employer's representatives to remove the employer's cartoons).
The court enforced this decision, stating:
The case here is much weaker for the Board agent's compromise of neutrality [than in Glacier]. The union and company
observer together removed the cartoons, with help from the
company personnel director. This bipartisan action should
have negated any inference of impartiality [sic, presumably
partiality] on the part of the Board. There would have been
more of an appearance of bias if the Board agent had removed
the cartoons herself, as in Glacier. The Board found that its
agent was overzealous; however, the Board did not abuse its
discretion in determining that it was highly unlikely that the
action could have had any effect on the outcome of the
election. 195

This reasoning is misguided in several respects. First, as the court
acknowledged, the employer "was within its rights in so displaying
the cartoons" and the Board admitted that its agent was "overzealous" in demanding their removal. 196 Given this clear violation of
the employer's campaign rights, 19 7 one could argue that the Board
194. 738 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1984) (per curiam), enforcing 251 N.L.R.B. 74 (1980). For
further discussion of Michigan Rubber see supra notes 131-133 and accompanying text.
195. 738 F.2d at 115.
196. Id.
197. Scholars such as Paul Weiler might object to any line of analysis that focuses on
the campaign "rights" of employers. In his insightful critique of existing law, Weiler
argues: "Because only the employees' interests are supposed to count in the certification
decision, the employer can claim no positive right to influence the employees' vote."
Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA. 96

L. REV. 1769, 1814 (1983). Even Weiler acknowledges, however, that an
argument can be made in favor of our current system which permits employers to
campaign against unionization:
A proponent of the current American model of the extended
HARV.

representation campaign . . . might grant that the employer has no

inherent right to protect its own interests by campaigning against
collective bargaining, yet at the same time he might defend the
employer's participation in election campaigns as an aid to informed
employee choice. An inevitable imbalance, he would argue, exists
between the employees who support the union and those who oppose it.
The supporters of the union have its resources and expertise to help
them make their case. The antiunion employees are disorganized and
unsophisticated. Such an unequal contest seems incompatible with
section 7 of the NLRA, which grants employees the right to decide not to
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had engaged in a per se violation of its own election standards. Second, the court's insistence that the Board agent did not remove the
cartoons herself seems woefully misdirected; forcing a party to dig
its own grave (with the cheerful assistance of its rival) could, if anything, heighten the appearance of Board partisanship. Third, the
Board's determination that it was unlikely that the coerced removal
affected the outcome of the election conspicuously ignores Athbro's
insistence on the intrinsic importance of maintaining the purity of
election standards. For these reasons, Michigan Rubber involves both
a questionable distinction of Glacier and a failure to heed the
message of Athbro.
Furthermore, as NLRB v. Fenway Cambridge Motor Hotel 198 exemplifies, even when tribunals purport to apply the principle of Athbro
they frequently distinguish the case on rather counterintuitive
grounds. In Fenway, the employer sought to overturn an election
based on an employee's affidavits that when he voted the Board's
agent originally instructed him to mark the pro-union box on the
ballot but, when he became angry, then pointed to both choices.' 9 9
The regional director acknowledged that if he credited the employee's affidavits rather than the conflicting testimony of the agent
and election observers, then a "serious breach may have occurred in
engage in collective bargaining. If this right is to have any meaning,
employees opposing unionization need the support of the employer,
which, in pursuit of its own interest in fending off unionization, will
perform the function of deflating the promises of the union proponents
and pointing out the risks for the employees in taking the path of
collective bargaining. This argument for designing the representation
process to permit effective employer participation rests, then, not on the
principle of fairness to employers, but rather on the practical judgment
that only the employer can defend the statutory rights of the antiunion
employees.
Id. at 1815 (footnotes omitted). I concur with Weiler's assessment that "this is the best
case that can be made for the American-style representation campaign." Id. It is not the
employer's "right" to campaign that concerns me, it is the freedom of employees to
make an informed choice in a laboratory free from the appearance of Board partiality.
Despite Weiler's recognition of the argument quoted above, his primary assertion
throughout Promises to Keep is that the current campaign system is so fraught with unfair
labor practices by employers and the remedies are so inadequate that it should be replaced by a Canadian-style system of "instant elections." It would be beyond the scope
of this Article to explore all of my objections to his provocative thesis, but two points are
in order. First, however prevalent employer abuses may be, I believe that the answer lies
in more rigorous prosecution and punishment of such employers than in depriving
workers of a full opportunity to hear and evaluate arguments both in favor of and in
opposition to unionization. Second, given that Weiler's bold proposal has not come to
pass, we should at least try to assure that the Board maintains its integrity and impartiality in representation matters.
198. 601 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1979), enforcing 237 N.L.R.B. 1540 (1978).
199. 601 F.2d at 36.
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the laboratory conditions required by the Board." 20 0 He concluded,
however, that no hearing was necessary to resolve this conflict because even if the employee were telling the truth those present at
the time already had voted, the employee did not relate the incident
to anyone else until after the election, and his own vote had not
20
been swayed by the alleged partisanship. '
This determination, which was adopted by the Board, was upheld
by the First Circuit even though it rejected the regional director's
reasoning. The court held that "the Regional Director erred in applying only an 'impact' standard to determine whether the elective
process was contaminated" and stated that, in light of Athbro, the
proper approach "is to assess on a case by case basis whether the
alleged misconduct 'tends to destroy confidence in the Board's election process' or 'could reasonably be interpreted as impugning the
20 2
election standards' sought to be maintained."
This assertion of Athbro proved hollow, however, for the court enforced the Board's opinion based on reasoning quite similar to that
of the regional director. The court argued:
Examined in light of the Athbro standard, the facts reveal that
the Board could reasonably decide that the neutrality of the
Board's procedures was not compromised by the agent's purported statement to the employee. Assuming that [the employee's] affidavits reflect the truth, he clearly indicated that
the agent immediately cured whatever contamination of the
election process she might have caused when she informed
him that he was free to check either the "Yes" or "No" box.
Given that no complaints of this nature were presented by any
of the other some one hundred voters, that no one else was a
party to the alleged conversation, and that [the employee]
stated that he was not influenced by the agent's conduct, we
consider this case distinguishable from Athbro ....203
Rather than a reasoned application of Athbro, the First Circuit's
logic appears to be an alarming departure from its precepts. In the
first place, its assertion that the agent "cured" whatever flaw she
created is singularly unconvincing. If we believe the employee's
story-as the court did for purposes of its analysis-the agent retreated from her pro-union stance only after the employee displayed
anger at her partisanship. The message that she favored the union
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 36-37. The court noted that "[wihile the procedural history of Athbro is

curious, its holding continues to be the yardstick against which misdeeds of Board
agents are measured." Id. at 37 (footnote omitted).
203. Id.
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had already been sent, and its original force was not completely
abated by the fact that she later pointed to both boxes to avoid a
confrontation.
The court's other reasons are equally unsatisfactory. That no
other misconduct occurred and that there were no other parties to
the conversation fail to distinguish Fenway from Athbro, for the latter
case involved only an isolated act of fraternization that was witnessed solely by an employee who already had voted. Furthermore,
the First Circuit's insistence that the employee's vote was not influenced also ignores Athbro's focus on whether the Board's appearance of integrity and impartiality has been undermined, regardless
of whether particular votes have been influenced.
Fenway thus presents a double irony: first, that the court disagreed with the regional director's reasoning but affirmed the
Board's result on equally unsatisfactory grounds; and second, that
the court diminished the force of the Athbro standard while purporting to uphold it. We are thus left with a case involving allegations of
grave bias in which the Board failed to apply Athbro and the court of
appeals distinguished away its true significance and power.
Moreover, Fenway was not an isolated aberration. In fact, a similar
issue was resolved in a practically identical fashion in Eskimo Radiator
Manufacturing Co., 20 4 where the employer objected that the Board
agent had encouraged an employee to vote for the union. The
Board overruled that objection based on the regional director's determination that the evidence "revealed, at most, only an apparent
misunderstanding by one voter of the agent's explanation to him of
how to mark the ballot, and this was insufficient evidence to establish the 'reasonable possibility of irregularity requisite to setting the
election aside.' "205
This determination was enforced by the Ninth Circuit, which
concluded:
Generally, the board will overturn an election if the conduct
of the board agent tends to destroy confidence in the board's
election process, or [if it] could reasonably be interpreted as
impuning [sic] the [Board's] election standards. The board
agent's statements were misunderstood. No other employees
heard what the agent said. Furthermore, Eskimo Radiator
does not offer evidence which shows that voters were swayed
20 6
by the agent's statement.
204. 255 N.L.R.B. 304 (1981), enforced per curiam, 688 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1982).
205. 255 N.L.R.B. at 305.
206. 688 F.2d at 1319 (citing NLRB v. Fenway Cambridge Motor Hotel, 601 F.2d 33,
37 (1st Cir. 1979)).
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As in Fenway, both the Board and the court failed to subject the
alleged misconduct to the careful scrutiny of Athbro, choosing instead to emphasize that no votes actually were influenced. One
might argue that the result in Eskimo Radiator is palatable given the
underlying factual conclusion that the Board agent had not encouraged the voter to support the union. The problem persists,
however, that the employee believed the agent had done so, which
also could impair the Board's image of impartiality.
This, of course, raises the fundamental question of whether the
Board should evaluate the appearance of impropriety based on its
own conclusion as to whether the agent acted improperly or, in contrast, from the employee's perspective of what took place. Although
Eskimo Radiator plainly prefers the former position, the Sixth Circuit
disagreed in NLRB v. State Plating & Finishing Co. 20 7 In State Plating,
the company's vice president explained that the employer could not
increase wages during the time period between the union's demand
for recognition and the election because it might appear as though it
were unlawfully attempting to buy votes. 20 8 When the employees
contacted a Board agent by telephone to confirm this, however, she
told them that "it was possible for an employer to give a pay raise
even though an election is coming." 20 9 This, unfortunately, led
many employees to believe that the vice president had lied to them
and the Board refused his request to clarify the law regarding pre210
election benefits after the employees rejected his explanations.
The employer therefore argued that the election was fatally unfair
because the agent had given the employees her opinion on a local
21
issue that was important to the outcome of the election. '
207. 738 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1984), denying enforcement to 262 N.L.R.B. 132 (1982).
208. 738 F.2d at 735. The vice president's statement was based upon the fact that
benefits granted during the critical preelection period frequently are found to be
unlawful inducements not to support the union. In fact, as the Sixth Circuit noted, "[i]t
would have been well nigh impossible for State Plating to rebut the presumption of
illegal motive with respect to any raises it might have awarded before the election." Id.
at 741 (footnote omitted). As the Supreme Court declared in NLRB v. Exchange Parts
Co.:
The danger inherent in well-timed increases in benefits is the suggestion
of a fist inside the velvet glove. Employees are not likely to miss the
inference that the source of benefits now conferred is also the source
from which future benefits must flow and which may dry up if it is not
obliged.
375 U.S. 405, 409 (1964) (footnote omitted). For a provocative critique of this presumption of inherent coercion, see Jackson & Heller, Promises and Grants of Benefits Under
the National Labor Relations Act, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1982).

209. 738 F.2d at 736.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 738.
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This objection was overruled by the Board 2 12 but sustained by the
Sixth Circuit. The court, which cited Athbro, first explained that
whether the agent knew she was wrongfully commenting on a local
issue was irrelevant because "[i]mpairment of Board neutrality is
dependent on the employee's perception of the Board agent's comments, not on who is to blame for that perception." 213 Indeed,
"[t]he appearance of compromise of Board neutrality will warrant
setting aside an election even if the Board in fact remains neutral." 21 4 The court then concluded:
The Board's neutrality was destroyed by the NLRB agent's
comment on a local issue which misled employees into believing that their employer had lied to them. The Board's findings
to the contrary are not supported by substantial evidence. As
the election was tainted by this failure of Board neutrality, the
union was improperly certified. Accordingly, the Board's ap2 15
plication for enforcement of its bargaining order is denied.
State Plating thus marked a rejection of Eskimo Radiator (as well as
Judge Gasch's pre-Athbro decision in Bullard2 16) in that it focused on
the employees' perception of bias rather than on whether bias existed in fact. This departure seems entirely reasonable given that
the primary reasons for ordering new elections are to assure the employees' freedom of choice and preserve faith in the voting process
rather than to punish Board agents for misconduct. Moreover, it is
17
in keeping with the approach of Provincial House, Inc. v. NLRB 2
that elections must be invalidated even when agents "involuntarily"
undermine the Board's appearance of neutrality. As was also true in
ProvincialHouse, however, it is regrettable that it was left to a circuit
court rather than the Board to defend the vitality of Athbro.
Furthermore, as NLRB v. Allen's I. G.A. Foodliner 218 demonstrates,
the public cannot rest assured that appellate courts routinely-will
uphold the spirit of Athbro when the Board itself fails to do so. In
212. 262 N.L.R.B. 132 (1982).
213. 738 F.2d at 739 n.5.
214. Id. at 740.
215. Id. at 742 (footnote omitted). In contrast with State Plating, the Board held that
Athbro was not violated when union advocates mischaracterized a regional director's
report during a representation campaign. See Six Flags Over Mid-America, Inc., 253
N.L.R.B. 111 (1980), enforced per curiam, 638 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1981). Six Flags, of course,
represents a far different situation from State Plating because it did not involve a Board
agent's commenting on a campaign issue.
216. Bullard Co. v. NLRB, 253 F. Supp. 391 (D.D.C. 1966), discussed supra at text
accompanying notes 50-53.
217. 568 F.2d 8, 10-11 (6th Cir. 1977), discussed supra at text accompanying notes 9094.
218. 652 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1980), enforcing 236 N.L.R.B. 1342 (1978).
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Allen's, the Sixth Circuit enforced the Board's bargaining order even
though the Board agent stated her belief that the employer and the
union were just putting on a show for the workers and that, in her
opinion, "if the employees had been treated right she would not be
there holding the election." 21 9 Although such a statement plainly
suggests that the employer had been abusing its workers, the court
concluded:
The Board's determination that the Board Agent's conduct
did not prevent a fair election was well within its discretion.
The Agent's statement to the Company observer was improper, but it was not prejudicial. The evidence establishes
that no voters were present in the polling place at the time
when the remark was made and that the incident took place at
a time when most of the voters had cast their ballots. Also,
there is no evidence in the record that the Agent's remark2 2was
0
relayed to any voter who had not yet cast his/her ballot.

Once again, we are faced with a situation in which the Board and
court blithely ignored Athbro, where it was equally true that the objectionable conduct did not occur in the presence of employees who
had not yet voted and in all probability did not influence their votes.
Furthermore, the court could even cite a Board opinion-Shorewood
Manor Nursing Home & Rehabilitation Center221-to legitimate its apparent neglect of Athbro. Given that the Board itself frequently has
abandoned the teachings of Athbro, it is only to be expected that cir2 22
cuit courts may follow suit.
219. 652 F.2d at 595.
220. Id. at 595-96.
221. 217 N.L.R.B. 1106 (1975), discussed supra at text accompanying notes 146-151.
222. Of course, the Board's inconsistent and unclear treatment of the Athbro principle
in no way excuses the equally arbitrary decisions by various reviewing courts. After all,
it is the assumption of careful judicial review that helps legitimate the vbry existence and
power of the Board and other administrative agencies. As Gerald Frug has reasoned:
Unlike both the formalist and the expertise models [of administrative
law], which seek to justify bureaucracy by properly organizing its
subjective and objective components, the judicial review and
market/pluralist models seek outside help to legitimate the bureaucratic
structure. The judicial review and market/pluralist models take as their
premise that no form of bureaucratic organization can be self-policing.
The judicial review model assigns the role of police officer to the courts,
and the model's ability to legitimate bureaucracy rests on this judicial
role. Bureaucratic legitimacy is derived from the courts' own legitimacy:
it is because we can trust the courts that we can trust the bureaucracy.
Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276, 1334 (1984).
Although Professor Frug delivers a provocative theoretical critique of the judicial review model (as well as other traditional conceptualizations of administrative law), it is
fair to say that many of us share that model's concern for the role ofjudges in assuring
bureaucratic legitimacy and are troubled when courts apparently fall into the same errors as the administrative agencies themselves.
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In light of decisions such as Allen's, one might be tempted to assume that Athbro is a dead letter. In truth, however, its principle was
applied recently in Hudson Aviation Services, 223 where the Board agent
engaged in a heated argument with the employer's assistant manager over whether a preelection agreement had been breached. In a
divided opinion, the Board reasoned:
[T]he Board agent's conduct communicated the impression
that the Board was displeased with and was criticizing the Employer's assistant manager and, thereby, undermined the indispensable perception of Board neutrality in the election.
...

[E]ven if the Board agent had correctly relied on a pree-

lection agreement to achieve her goal of removing the assistant manager from the dispatcher's office, her conduct
nevertheless would warrant setting aside the election. Contrary to the dissent's implication, the issue before us is not
whether the Employer engaged in objectionable conduct but,
rather, whether the actions of the Board agent reasonably
could be interpreted as impugning the election standards we
22 4
seek to maintain.
Hudson Aviation stands as a prominent and long overdue resurrection of the Athbro doctrine by the Board itself. As the hearing officer
reasoned, under Athbro the election was invalid even though only
two employees learned of the agent's outburst before they voted
and the Board agent's tantrum could not have altered the election's
outcome. 22 5 The Board approved of this reasoning, stating:
We further agree with the hearing officer's reliance on Athbro
Engineering Corp., and Glacier Packing Co. As noted by the hearing officer, the Board in Athbro abandoned a standard of assessing only whether Board agent conduct affected the votes
of employees. Thus, the Board there set aside the election because the Board agent's conduct ...

tended to destroy confi-

dence in the Board's election process or reasonably could
have been interpreted as impugning the standards of integrity
and neutrality which the Board seeks to maintain in elections.
Significantly, the Board set aside the election where the Board
agent's conduct was observed only by one employee who had
already voted and who, in turn, had reported the incident to
the employer, and notwithstanding the fact that the Board
agent's conduct did not affect the votes of employees. 226
223. 288 N.L.R.B. No. 94 (April 29, 1988).
224. Id. (footnote omitted).
225. Id.
226. Id. at n.6 (citing Athbro Precision Eng'g Corp., 166 N.L.R.B. 966 (1967); Glacier
Packing Co., 210 N.L.R.B. 571 (1974)).
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Upon reading Hudson Aviation, it could be argued that the Board
has returned wholeheartedly to the idealistic, prophylactic standard
of Athbro. The most recent Board decision in this area, however,
suggests that it would be premature to conclude that Hudson Aviation
will join Athbro and Glacier as a powerful triad protecting the Board's
appearance of integrity and neutrality.
In S. Lichtenberg & Co., the Board refused to vacate a union's victory despite a Board attorney's highly ambiguous comments that
were published shortly before the election.2 27 Unfair labor practice
charges had been filed against the employer and a local newspaper
reporter interviewed a union advocate, representatives of the employer, and a Board attorney concerning those charges. The article
summarized the union's allegations, the employer's responses, and
the Board attorney's comments, all in a colloquial manner. In one
part of that article, the Board attorney was quoted as stating that
"[w]hat is illegal . . .is an employer that does not give a flying fig

before about what is wrong [at the workplace] and all of a sudden,
when the union comes in [to campaign], they want to be Mr. Good
Guy."228

At least two employees testified that this statement led them to
believe that the Board favored the union. 229 Nonetheless, the
Board upheld the election on the following grounds:
We have reviewed under the standard set forth in Athbro Precision Engineering Corp., the judge's overruling of the Employer's objection that a Board attorney's comments in a local
newspaper article published 5 days before the election impaired the Board's appearance of neutrality. The Board attorney's statements, read in the context of the entire article,
which included statements of the Employer's attorney as well,
no more than explained, in an accurate (although colloquial)
manner, the nature of the allegations of an unfair labor practice complaint that had recently issued against the Employer,
pursuant to the Regional Director's investigation of contemporaneous charges filed by the Union. That complaint had already been copied by the Union and widely distributed among
unit employees, so the Board attorney's statements did not refer to a matter whose existence was unknown to the employees. The article repeatedly asserted that the complaint against
the Employer involved "allegations." It also noted that the
decision on the complaint would be made by a special magistrate. Nevertheless, some confusion among employees, not fa227. 296 N.L.R.B. No. 167 (Oct. 11, 1989).
228. Id.
229. Id.
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miliar with Board processes, concerning the nature of the
Board's role in the pending election was both reasonable and
unavoidable. That confusion, however, stemmed not from the
attorney's comments, but from the exercise of the Regional
Director's dual responsibilities, on behalf of the General
Counsel in the unfair labor practice proceeding and on behalf
of the Board in the representation proceeding. In these circumstances, the mere fact that the attorney described the position the General Counsel was taking in the complaint cannot
reasonably be found to constitute objectionable conduct destructive of Board neutrality under the Athbro standard.2 30
Whether Lichtenberg reaches a just result is debatable. Although
this case is not as troublesome as Botany Worsted Mills,2 3 the Board's
reasoning in Lichtenberg leaves much to be desired. The Board
agent's remarks were ill-considered, ambiguous, and may well have
caused employees to believe that the Board favored the union in the
election. Furthermore, the fact that laypersons can easily be confused about the Board's different roles in elections and unfair labor
practice proceedings would seem to condemn rather than excuse
the agent's remarks. Given the likelihood of confusion, the agent
should have taken particular care to clarify the Board's neutrality
with regard to the upcoming election. The result in Lichtenberg may
be defensible but the Board's reasoning is just too shallow.
Furthermore, it is troublesome that the Board simply cited Athbro
without any discussion of its rationale or explicit effort to apply its
reasoning to the facts at hand. In this regard, Lichtenberg exemplifies
the Board's frequent and regrettable habit of merely citing Athbro to
legitimate diverse conclusions in cases that appear highly analogous. Citing Athbro in such a perfunctory manner can only deepen
the confusion in this area of the law. Indeed, Lichtenberg suggests
that the Board will continue to send occult and contradictory
messages concerning the problem of perceived partisanship.
D.

The Problem of Other Administrative Irregularities

As discussed above, fraternization, the delegation of duties, and
allegedly partisan statements or actions may all raise serious questions concerning the Board's appearance of integrity and impartiality. There are a number of other ways, however, in which the
Board's aura of neutrality may be undermined. Although these
problems do not fit neatly into discrete categories, the concerns they
230. Id. (citing Athbro Precision Eng'g Corp., 166 N.L.R.B. 966 (1967)).
231. 56 N.L.R.B. 370 (1944). For a discussion of Botany Worsted, see supra notes 30-36
and accompanying text.
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raise merit the attention of anyone seriously concerned about the
Board's role in conducting representation elections. Furthermore,
the same doctrinal conflicts and competing visions of election standards are replicated in such cases, with the same disturbing inconsistencies we have seen above. Regardless of the type of alleged
misconduct involved, the Board and the courts have failed to present a coherent and predictable picture of how these problems
should be resolved in particular cases.
Regardless of the particular allegation at issue, the Board is reluctant to hold that its agents have spoiled an election's laboratory conditions so severely that the vote must be set aside. This reluctance
persists, moreover, even when Board agents have failed to follow
the Board's own procedures. In Polymers, Inc., 2 3 2 for example, the
employer requested reconsideration of the Board's prior decisions
in representation and complaint proceedings on the grounds that an
agent had failed to comply with a then-current version of the
Board's Casehandling Manual and a memorandum issued by the local regional director to his professional staff. More specifically, the
employer argued that the agent's failure to retain physical custody
of the sealed ballot box and blank ballots at all times violated instructions set forth in those two documents and that this deviation
"requires the invalidation of the election, either because such rules
are an official embodiment of what constitutes 'appropriate standards' or because adherence to said rules is 'required.' "233 The
Board rejected that assertion, however, stating that "the Board and
its agents cannot be considered 'bound' by [such rules] in the sense
that any deviation from these rules by a Board agent would require
23 4
nullification of an election."
The Board reasoned that although the introduction to the Casehandling Manual stated: "Adherence to [the contents of the Manual] is required," this was merely "an instruction by the General
Counsel to his subordinates relating to the performance of their duties, and not a declaration by the Board as to the standards to be
applied in appraising the validity of an election. '"' 2 5 The Board then
explained:
Election procedures prescribed by the General Counsel or a
Regional Director are obviously intended to indicate to field
personnel those safeguards of accuracy and security thought
232.
(1970).
233.
234.
235.

174 N.L.R.B. 282, enforced, 414 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1010
174 N.L.R.B. at 282.
Id. at 282 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 282 n.5.
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to be optimal in typical election situations. These desired
practices may not always be met to the letter, sometimes
through neglect, sometimes because of the exigencies of circumstance. The question which the Board must decide in
each case in which there is a challenge to conduct of the election is whether the manner in which the election was conducted raises a reasonable doubt as to the fairness and validity
2 36
of the election.
Indeed, the Board reasoned:
It might well be that, in a given case, even literal compliance
with all of the rules, regulations, and guidelines would not satisfy the Board that the integrity of the election was not compromised. Conversely, the failure to achieve absolute
compliance with these rules does not necessarily require that a
new election be ordered, although, of course, deviation from
standards formulated by experts for the guidance of those
conducting elections will be given appropriate weight in our
determinations. In considering whether there has been a
breach of security in an election, or a reasonable possibility of
such a breach, we are examining into questions of fact and inference. To answer these questions, we look at all the facts. 2 37
The Board then concluded that "desirable election standards
were met" despite the agent's alleged violation of the rules because
of "the extreme improbability of any violation of the ballot box"
and "the absence of any affirmative indication of tampering." 23 8
This decision may be defended on the grounds that the Board
wisely chose to focus on whether the election's integrity actually had
been compromised in that particular case rather than on whether its
internal instructions had been precisely followed. This approach
236. Id. at 282 (footnotes omitted).
237. Id. at 282-83. The Manual now states the following in its introductory "Purpose
of Manual":

This manual has been prepared by the General Counsel of the National
Labor Relations Board pursuant to powers delegated to him/her by the
Board. It is intended to provide procedural and operational guidance for
the Agency's staff in the handling of representation cases under the
National Labor Relations Act. It is not intended to be a compendium of
either substantive or procedural law, nor can it be a substitute for a
knowledge of the law. The guidelines included are not Board rulings or
directives and although it is expected that they will be followed by staff
employees in the handling of cases, it is also expected that there may be
departures through exercise of professional judgment in varying
circumstances. They are not intended to be and should not be viewed as
binding procedural rules.
NLRB, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD CASEHANDLING MANUAL (PART Two) REPRESENTATION PROCEEDINGS (Sept. 1989).
238. 174 N.L.R.B. at 283.
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may be sensible because, as the Board realized, technical violations
of the Casehandling Manual may not necessarily raise real doubts
concerning an election's fairness whereas such concerns can exist
even when an agent rigidly adheres to the Manual.
The downside, of course, is that the Board's failure to insist on
the strict observance of its own rules and guidelines could convey
the perception that the Board is "above" its own internal law. Intertwined with this concern is the problem that it becomes increasingly
difficult for citizens to appraise the legitimacy of Board actions when
those actions are measured on an ad hoc case-by-case basis rather
than in accordance with written, strictly-enforced rules. This caseby-case approach may well be justified insofar as it permits the
Board to preserve flexibility and concentrate on the actual procedural fairness of elections, but its inevitable price is that it deprives
the public of clear, formal criieria by which to judge the Board's
conduct.
Similar issues appeared in Benavent & Fournier,239 where a majority
of the Board overruled the employer's objection that the agent had
left an unsealed ballot box and unused ballots in the custody of election observers for several minutes. The majority reasoned that
although "it is better procedure for the Board Agent to retain custody of the unmarked ballots at all times," the election was valid
because the observers safeguarded the ballots, no one touched them
in the agent's absence, and therefore "there could not have been
240
any effect on the election."
Such reasoning seems acceptable if one focuses on the fact that
no "harm" was done in the sense that apparently no one stuffed the
ballot box. Citing Athbro, however, Board member Kennedy dissented on the grounds that the agent's action transgressed the "cardinal principle" of the Board's 1967 Field Manual that "before,
during, or after an election, no one should be permitted to handle
any ballot except a Board agent and the individual who votes that
ballot." 2 4 Based on this "serious irregularity," the fact that unauthorized access to the ballot box was "possible," and that the employer's observer had refused to sign a certificate stating that the
box had been protected at all times, Kennedy believed that the
agent's conduct violated Athbro's concern for maintaining the
242
Board's election standards.
239.
240.
241.
242.

208 N.L.R.B. 636 (1974).
Id. at 636 n.2.
Id. at 637 (Kennedy, dissenting).
Id. at 636-37 (Kennedy, dissenting).
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Benavent & Fournieris a difficult case, for one can sympathize with
Kennedy's position that the agent's failure to follow the Field Manual had made election tampering possible and that this obviously
could raise doubts concerning both the integrity of the Board's
processes and the validity of the results. Those doubts should be
counterbalanced, however, by the majority's conclusion that no one
actually had tampered with the ballots. Kennedy's concern for election standards is commendable, but the majority may have been correct in its conclusion that there was no threshold proof of ballot
interference to give rise to legitimate questions regarding the
Board's neutrality or integrity. Polymers and Benavent & Fournier
therefore may be consistent with the Athbro principle in that they
simply refused to invalidate elections based on what seemed to be
technical transgressions by Board agents that did not seriously un243
dermine the Board's appearance of fairness and impartiality.
Many alleged improprieties can arise from a Board agent's handling of challenges to voters. Under the Department of Labor's regulations, a Board agent, the employer, and the union may each
challenge a potential voter's eligibility to participate in an election.
The voter then casts a challenged ballot and the Board later resolves
the eligibility question if it could alter the election's outcome. 24 4 As
243. Cf Skyline Corp. v. NLRB, 613 F.2d 1328, 1332-33 (5th Cir. 1980), enforcing 240
N.L.R.B. 737 (1979) (upholding election despite employer's allegation that Board
Manual was violated because agent did not seal envelopes containing challenged ballots
with tape, there was no label identifying the person who sealed envelope, and no
document was filed stating where challenged ballots were stored); NLRB v. Capitan
Drilling Co., 408 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1969), enforcing 167 N.L.R.B. 144 (1967) (upholding
election in the face of employer's contention that one of the seams on the ballot box was
not sealed with tape); Brink's Armored Car, 278 N.L.R.B. 141 (1986) (disapproving of
Board agent's decision to let employee pick up mail ballot for coworker but certifying
election because the ballot never actually left the agent's possession); Niagra Wires, Inc.,
238 N.L.R.B. 1347, 1347 n.2 (1978) (holding that slight movement of tape sealing the
ballot box was "truly de minimis"). My discussion of Polymers and Benavent & Fournieris by
no means an exhaustive treatment of the various approaches the Board has taken
concerning allegations that ballot boxes were left unattended during an election. To the
contrary, I have chosen to examine only two leading cases in that area which contain
discussions most relevant to the topic of this Article. Readers seeking a more in-depth
analysis of the Board's efforts to safeguard the integrity of ballot boxes should consult
WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 408-13.
244. As 29 C.F.R. § 102.69 (1988) provides:
Any party and Board agents may challenge, for good cause, the eligibility
of any person to participate in the election. The ballots of such
challenged persons shall be impounded .... [I]f the challenged ballots

are sufficient in number to affect the results of the election, the regional
director shall ... initiate an investigation, as required, of such objections
or challenges.
Similarly, 29 C.F.R. § 101.19 (1988) (Board's Statements of Procedure) states that
"[tihe Board agents and authorized observers have the privilege of challenging for rea-
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the Board acknowledged in Schwartz Brothers, Inc., 24 5 section 11338
of the Board's Field Manual at that time provided that "the Board
agent will not make challenges on behalf of the parties, whether or
not such parties have observers present." In that case, however, the
agent stated challenges raised by the union because the employer
refused to permit the union's would-be observer (a recently terminated employee) to remain on the premises. Citing Athbro, the employer argued that this gave the impression that the Board favored
the union in the election. The regional director disagreed, however,
finding that the Board's neutrality had not been compromised by
the action and that the agent's departure from the Field Manual's
guidelines was justified because the union could not supply another
observer and potentially ineligible voters could have cast ballots if
the agent had not taken the role of challenging them.2 46 Based on
this ruling, the Board certified the election and ordered the em2 47
ployer to bargain with the union.
This bargaining order was then enforced by the D.C. Circuit.2 48
The court emphasized that the Field Manual simply provides guidance for Board personnel that must be tempered according to the
particular circumstances that arise in elections2 4 9 and that the agent
had merely "stated" the challenges that the union had "made" on its
list of challenges. 2 50 The court therefore concluded that "neutrality
sonable cause employees who apply for ballots" and that "[i]f challenged ballots are
sufficient in number to affect the results of the election, the Regional Director conducts
an investigation and rules on the challenges."
245. 194 N.L.R.B. 150, 151 (1971), enforced, 475 F.2d 926 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
246. 194 N.L.R.B. at 150-51.
247. Id. at 151, 153.
248. NLRB v. Schwartz Bros., Inc., 475 F.2d 926 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
249. Id. at 929 n.3.
250. Id. at 928, 930 (emphasis in original). Section 11338 now provides in relevant
part:
Any observer has the right to challenge a voter for cause. The Board
agent must challenge anyone whose name is not on the eligibility list or
who has been permitted by the Board to vote subject to challenge. Also,
the agent must challenge a voter if he/she knows or has reason to believe
that the voter is ineligible to vote, but, in this instance only if none of the
parties voices a challenge on that ground: The Board agent will not make
challenges on behalf of the parties whether or not such parties have
observers present. See Galli Produce Co., 269 NLRB 478 (1984).
However, if any party genuinely cannot obtain an observer, the Board
agent should, on good cause alleged by the party, state that party's
challenge to a voter whose eligibility that party questions. The Board
agent should advise the party that he/she does not assume responsibility
for assuring that the voter's ballot will be challenged. Except when
directed in the Regional Director's decision or the Board action on a
request for review or when a prospective voter's name is on the eligibility
list, the challenge is not made on behalf of the Board but is in terms of
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was maintained in the manner in which the challenges were stated"
and that the employer failed to carry its burden of showing that the
25 1
election was unfair.
An employer's objection to a Board agent's handling of challenges was also rejected in NLRB v. Computer Sciences Corp., 252 where
the Fifth Circuit explained:
The Company ... contends that the election should be in-

validated since the Agent exhibited his pro-union feelings to
the voters by suggesting that the Company's challenges were
frivolous and by denying these challenges .... In this case,

there is no indication in the record that any voter even
observed the colloquy between the Agent and the Company's
attorney regarding the challenges. Moreover, the administration of the system is an essential part of the Agent's job, and
the conduct of the Agent here in disallowing the challenges
2 53
did not demonstrate partiality toward the Union.
Schwartz Brothers and Computer Sciences are not difficult opinions; in
each case the Board and court of appeals fairly recognized that an
agent's role in the voter challenging process must not be circumscribed by frivolous allegations of bias. Other cases, however, are
not so simple. In Sonoma Vineyards, Inc., 254 the employer made several objections to the agent's conduct, including an allegation that
the agent told the union's observer that there were various ways to
prove challenges and he believed it would be easy for the union to
do so. This remark seems improper because it borders on the giving of legal advice to one party for its use against the other. Furthermore, this appearance of favoritism toward the union may well
stating the party's challenge (e.g., "the union has challenged your right to
vote on the ground that you are a supervisor"). When directed by the
Board, the challenge is to be made in terms of the basis for the Board's
reservation (e.g., "The Board has been unable to decide whether you are
eligible to vote based on the union's contention that you are a supervisor
rather than an employee"). The voter should then be voted under the
challenge.
NLRB,

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD CASEHANDLING MANUAL (PART Two) REPRE-

§ 11338 (Sept. 1989) (emphasis in original).
251. 475 F.2d at 930. The court emphasized:
If a charge is levied that the Board agent was not completely impartial,
the burden shall be on the alleging party to prove the partiality. As is
always the case, the challenging party has the burden of showing that the

SENTATION PROCEEDINGS

election was not fairly conducted, for it is not up to the Board to establish
the validity of the election.

Id.
252. 589 F.2d 232 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam), enforcing 234 N.L.R.B. 1163 (1978).
253. 589 F.2d at 235.
254. 264 N.L.R.B. 642, 643 (1982), enforced, 727 F.2d 860 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 836 (1984).
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have been magnified by the fact that the agent later resigned from
the Board and accepted a position with the union in which he
helped the union gain representation rights in that particular bargaining unit. The Board, however, accepted the regional director's
conclusion that even if the statements were made, they were not
overheard by the employees and "could not have had a material impact on the election." 2 55 In addition, the Board stated that although
it "might question the former Board agent's judgment in accepting
responsibility for the Union's efforts to secure recognition" from
the employer, "his employment with the Union in connection with
this proceeding does not vitiate our earlier findings regarding his
2 56
conduct during the election."
This resolution of the case is problematic because it apparently
applies only an outcome-determinism test to judge the agent's comments. Given the regional director's conclusion that the remarks
did not have a material impact on the election's result, the Board
was not interested in asking whether they nonetheless could have
impaired the Board's image of neutrality. Furthermore, although a
former Board agent should not be forever barred from representing
a party in an election he once supervised, the fact that the agent
joined the union's efforts to gain recognition from that particular
employer quite easily could have strengthened the employees' perception that the Board was pro-union. The Ninth Circuit enforced
the, Board's opinion, however, on the grounds that "[i]t is unlikely
that this allegedly offending conduct interfered with or inhibited the
free choice of the employees in selecting their bargaining representative, or with the employee's [sic] actions at the polls" and that the
agent's subsequent employment with the union "did not affect the
2 57
impartiality of the election."
Sioux Products, Inc. v. NLRB 2 58 marks another example of where
the Board and court concluded that an agent's handling of challenges did not contaminate the election. In addition to the objections mentioned earlier, 259 the employer argued that the agents
impermissibly aided the union in making its challenges and that one
agent even "bugg[ed] her eyes out" to signal the union to challenge
a particular voter. 2 60 The court approved the Board's rejection of
255. 264 N.L.R.B. at 643-44.
256. Id. at 644.
257. NLRB v. Sonoma Vineyards, Inc., 727 F.2d 860, 863-64 (9th Cir. 1984).
258. 703 F.2d 1010 (7th Cir. 1983), denying enforcement on other grounds to 258 N.L.R.B.

287 (1981).
259. See supra note 121.
260. 703 F.2d at 1015.
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these objections, however, because the hearing officer had discredited the testimony regarding eye signals and held that the other al26
leged assistance was not fatally improper. '
In other cases, however, the Board has taken a strict approach
toward alleged agent misconduct in cases involving the handling of
challenged ballots. In Laszlo & Paulette Fono,2 62 the Board set aside a
union victory because the agent violated the Board's Casehandling
Manual by failing to place the small envelopes containing challenged ballots in a larger, sealed envelope immediately after the
election and by later examining the smaller envelopes outside of the
presence of the parties' representatives. The Board explained:
The Board, through its entire history, consistently has gone
to great lengths to assure that its role in the conduct of elections is not subject to question. Board election procedures are
designed to ensure both parties an opportunity to monitor the
conduct of the election, ballot count, and determinative procedure ....We are not questioning the integrity or neutrality of
the Regional Office personnel involved here. Rather, the appearance of irregularity created by the procedures used and
the impact of that appearance on the election's validity leads
2 63
us to conclude that this election must be set aside.
The Fono decision represents the Board at its most idealistic.
Without questioning its agent's honesty or the accuracy of the reported results, the Board invalidated the election due to the possible appearance of irregularity. As the Board reasoned, "if this
Agency is to maintain the public's confidence in its election
processes, it is imperative that the Board act dutifully to set aside
elections whenever there is any appearance of irregularity in the handling of ballots." 26 4 Similarly, in D & N Delivery Corp.,265 the Board
set aside an employer's victory because the regional director violated the Board's Rules and Regulations by counting several challenged ballots when the parties had not waived their right to
challenge his rulings concerning the validity of those ballots. The
Board reasoned that "inasmuch as the Regional Director's breach of
the Rules and Regulations may create the appearance that the Board
has prejudged the issues as to the eligibility of the [challenged vot-

261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id.
273 N.L.R.B. 1326 (1984).
Id. at 1328 (footnotes omitted).
Id. (emphasis added).
201 N.L.R.B. 277, 278 (1973).
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ers], we... shall vacate the election results and direct the holding of
26 6
a new election."
The Board also took a rigorous approach toward the treatment of
challenged ballots in its recentJakel decision.2 6 7 InJakel, a woman
had just finished voting when the union observer reminded the
Board agent that she should have been allowed to cast only a challenged ballot. The agent responded by removing a ballot from the
ballot bag, showing it to the woman, and destroying it when she said
it was hers. She was then given another ballot which was placed in
an envelope for challenged ballots.
Quoting Athbro, the regional director decided that this occurrence
constituted grounds for setting aside the union's electoral defeat.
He explained:
[T]he removal of a ballot from the ballot bag by the Board
agent compromised the integrity of the election process and
constituted conduct which would destroy confidence in the
Board's election process. Moreover, it cannot now be determined with reasonable accuracy whose ballot was extracted
from the ballot bag. Further, [the woman voting] was one of
three voters whose challenged ballots were sufficient in
number to affect the results of the election, and the desires of
the employees in the election can be accurately ascertained
only by setting the election aside and directing a new one. 268
The Board then denied the employer's request to review the regional director's decision. 269 That refusal was sound, for the regional director had applied Athbro in a clear and correct manner. It
is worth noting, however, thatJakel is not the "pure" Athbro scenario
where an election was invalidated even though the agent's misconduct almost surely did not affect the election's results. To the contrary, as the regional director remarked, in Jakel the vote was so
close that the election's outcome as well as the Board's image may
have been affected. It therefore is unclear whether the Board will
now apply Athbro in its full idealistic force-as it did in Hudson 2 70 or continue with its spasmodic behavior.
266. Id. Cf NLRB v. Chelsea Clock Co., 411 F.2d 189, 194 (1st Cir. 1969) (holding
that regional director wrongfully abandoned his responsibility to determine validity of
challenged ballots and citing Athbro's "salutary concern for propriety in the conducting
of consent elections"), denying enforcement to 170 N.L.R.B. 69 (1968).
267. Jakel, Inc., 293 N.L.R.B. No. 72 (April 3, 1989).
268. Id. (citation omitted).
269. Id.
270. 288 N.L.R.B. No. 94 (April 29, 1988), discussed supra at notes 223-26 and
accompanying text.
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The Board occasionally has taken steps to preserve the integrity
of representation elections from other administrative irregularities
as well. In Kerona Plastics Extrusion Co., 2 7 1 for example, the Board set
aside an election because the agent's premature closure of the
morning polling session allegedly prompted rumors that the agent
favored the employer and induced many workers to respond by voting for the union in the afternoon's polling session. 2 72 The Board
reasoned:
It is impossible here to determine whether the aforementioned irregularity affected the outcome of the election. However, we find that the laboratory conditions have been
disturbed to such a serious extent that in the interest of maintaining our standards there appears to be no alternative but to
2 73
set this election aside and to direct a new election.
In Summa Corp. v. NLRB, 274 the Ninth Circuit showed equal concern for the effect administrative blunders may have on employees'
perceptions and their voting behavior. In Summa, the Board certified an election even though, in violation of a preelection agreement, the union had been represented by more observers than the
employer.2 75 The Ninth Circuit reversed, however, on the following
grounds:
We find that the stipulation providing for an equal number
of observers is material to the election process. The language
of the stipulation itself indicates that the parties intended to
rely upon their observers to carry out the important functions
of challenging voters and generally monitoring the election
process. Each party reasonably desired to prevent the other
from enjoying a relative advantage in this function. Moreover,
we agree with Summa that there is a significant risk that an
imbalance in the number of observers, with the acquiescence
of the Board agent, could create an impression of predominance on the part of the Union and partiality on the part of the
Board. 2 76
271. 196 N.L.R.B. 1120 (1972).
272. Id. at 1120. Kerona demonstrates how the appearance of Board favoritism can be
a two-edged sword: parties may be hurt as well as benefitted by the voting employees'
perception of preferential treatment by Board agents.
273. Id. (citation omitted).
274. 625 F.2d 293 (9th Cir. 1980), denying enforcement to 242 N.L.R.B. 590 (1979).
275. 242 N.L.R.B. 590 (1979) (granting summary judgment based on an earlier,
unpublished decision).
276. 625 F.2d at 295. The court also reasoned: "The impact that the breach had
upon the minds of voters would be difficult to prove. We think that a party to a consent
election, reasonably anticipating this difficulty of proof, has a right through pre-election
contract to guard against misconduct material to the election process." Id. at 295-96
(footnote omitted).
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In essence, the Summa court did nothing more than to insist upon
fair play in accordance with a previously arranged agreement. That
can hardly seem controversial; the only peculiarity is that the Board
did not reach the same conclusion on its own. 2 77 A court also had to
take the initiative to protect election standards in Home Town Foods,
Inc. v. NLRB, 27 s where the Fifth Circuit remanded the Board's decision for a full hearing on whether an agent's alleged failure to stop
union supporters from unlawfully electioneering and engaging in
other forms of misconduct destroyed requisite laboratory conditions. Upon remand, the Board determined that the election was
valid, but the Fifth Circuit once again set aside the Board's order.2 7 9
Citing Athbro and quoting from General Shoe Corp., 280 the court
concluded:
Because in the instant case the Board acquiesced in preelection misconduct by the union supporters and in election
day misconduct by the union agent, union supporters and the
Board agent, which, viewed cumulatively obviously resulted in
"the standards of election campaigning [and conduct]
drop[ping] too low, the requisite laboratory conditions [were]
not present, and the experiment must be conducted over
again." 28 1

277. In two recent cases the Board has shown greater sensitivity toward allegations
that a Board agent's blunders contaminated the balloting process. In Sugar Food Inc.,
293 N.L.R.B. No. 123 (May 10, 1989), the Board invalidated an election because the
agent permitted balloting to take place in violation of a stipulation that a union observer
would be present. In Case Egg & Poultry Co., 293 N.L.R.B. No. 120 (May 8, 1989), the
Board directed a hearing on an employer's objection alleging that the agent
compromised ballot secrecy by failing to supply a voting booth. In Ashland Chemical
Co., 295 N.L.R.B. No. 117 (July 24, 1989), however, the Board refused to set aside an
election even though the agent failed to wait for the arrival of the employer's election
observer before slitting open the ballot box for the start of the second voting session.
278. 379 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1967), denying enforcement to 160 N.L.R.B. 8 (1966).
Although the Board's original opinion was rendered before Athbro, Home Town Foods is
discussed here because the subsequent opinions by the Board and court in that case
were written well after Athbro.
279. Home Town Foods, Inc. v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1969), denying
enforcement to 172 N.L.R.B. 1242 (1968).
280. 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948), quoted supra in text accompanying notes 5-6.
281. 416 F.2d at 399-400. The court later rejected the Board's claim that it had
imposed an "unrealistically 'ideal' standard" upon it. Id. at 400. Although the court
agreed with the message of Morganton Full Fashioned Hosiery, 107 N.L.R.B. 1534,
1538 (1954), that "the adoption of a laboratory standard should not be construed to
mean that the Board will ignore the realities of industrial life" and the teaching of
Liberal Market Inc., 108 N.L.R.B. 1481, 1482 (1954), that "[w]e seek to establish ideal
conditions insofar as possible, but we appraise the actual facts in the light of realistic
standards of human conduct," it still believed that the Board had failed to live up to its
own standards for the supervision of elections. 416 F.2d at 400 & nn. 1-2.
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In Home Town Foods, therefore, the Fifth Circuit emphasized that
the Board has an affirmative duty to regulate its electoral laboratory
and to prevent prejudicial misconduct by the competing parties. In
Amalgamated Service & Allied IndustriesJoint Board v. NLRB,2 82 however, the Board and the Second Circuit rejected the employer's argument that the Board agent transgressed Athbro by failing to stop
union observers from conversing with employees while they waited
to vote and by not preventing certain employees from chanting prounion slogans during the balloting. The court concluded that "the
failure of the Board to prevent the alleged misconduct did not impugn the integrity of the election" 283 and emphasized that the "laboratory conditions" standard must be applied in a practical fashion
which recognizes that the ideal may never be completely satisfied.
The court declared:
The idea of laboratory conditions is a useful guide for measuring the conduct of an election. However, it is probably not
possible to completely achieve such ideal conditions, and elections will not automatically be voided whenever they fall short
of that standard. Rather, the idea of laboratory conditions
must be realistically applied. The Board has broad discretion
to determine whether the circumstances of an election come
sufficiently close to laboratory conditions so that employees
can exercise free choice in deciding whether to select the
28 4
Union as their representative.
This statement may be viewed as a well-reasoned caution that the
laboratory conditions standard must be interpreted and applied in a
reasonable manner, for neither the Board nor the courts can demand that elections occur in a vacuum devoid of human foibles.
The problem, however, is that the court provided no guidance on
how to ascertain whether proper election conditions have been met.
No guidelines were established other than the vague reference to
laboratory conditions and no authority was cited to provide the
Board, courts, and public with any criteria to apply. The court's
treatment of Athbro was equally problematic. The court noted that
Athbro involved fraternization rather than failure to prevent misconduct, but failed to explain why this distinction might be meaningful. 285 Amalgamated Service therefore offered a practical direction not
282. 815 F.2d 225, 227-31 (2d Cir. 1987), enforcing Angelica Healthcare Serv. Group,
Inc., 280 N.L.R.B. 864 (1986).
283. 815 F.2d at 231-32.
284. Id. at 227.

285. Id. at 231. The court merely concluded that Athbro was not "on point" because
"the Board agent in charge of the election drank a beer with one of the union's
representatives during a break in the polling .

. .

. Here, however, the failure of the
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to demand the impossible from Board agents, but failed to delineate
what standards of conduct fall above or below the line of
28 6
objectionability.
Even worse, Fotomat Corp. v. NLRB 28 7 cited Athbro only to ignore
its meaning in a case involving plain misconduct by the Board. In
Fotomat, the Board's hearing officer admitted that he erred in not
granting the employer access to the pretrial affidavits of witnesses
who testified at the hearing but the Board nonetheless accepted his
determination to uphold the election even though its own regulations on this matter had been violated. 288 Furthermore, the Board
even refused to produce these documents for the court of appeals,
which could have precluded the judges from effectively weighing the
28 9
potential prejudice of the wrongful denial to the employer.
Although the Sixth Circuit cited Athbro and disapproved of "this unBoard agent to prevent the alleged misconduct did not impugn the integrity of the
election." Id. This statement naturally begs the question as to why fraternization fatally
violates laboratory conditions whereas failure to end a union's election day misconduct
does not.
286. Notwithstanding this criticism, I would agree that the Board and courts wisely
have overruled objections that plainly did not raise questions of serious impairment of
election standards. In NLRB v. First Union Management, 777 F.2d 330 (6th Cir. 1985)
(per curiam), enforcing 271 NLRB No. 163 (1984) (unpublished decision), for example,
the court rightfully rejected an employer's claim that a Board agent compromised the
Board's neutrality by permitting the union's election observer to wear an observer
badge slightly different from that worn by the employer's observer. More recently, in
Kleen Brite Laboratories, 292 N.L.R.B. No. 75 (January 31, 1989), enforced sub nom.
RochesterJoint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union, 896 F.2d 24 (2d
Cir. 1990), the Board correctly applied Athbro and overruled an employer's objection
that laboratory conditions were destroyed when the Board prematurely disclosed a
bargaining unit determination to the union.
At other times, unfortunately, the Board and courts have offered insufficient
reasoning to explain their results. In Victoria Station, Inc. v. NLRB, 586 F.2d 672, 675
(9th Cir. 1978), enforcing 233 N.L.R.B. 33 (1977), for instance, the court baldly stated:
"While it is true that the Board's agent at times might have been more attentive to the
election, these lapses caused no harm and provide no basis for setting the elections
aside." 586 F.2d at 675. Although this conclusion may have been correct, neither the
court's opinion nor the Board's published decision specified precisely what this
inattentiveness entailed and why it did not corrupt the election process. For this reason,
both opinions fail to convey any adequately defined normative message concerning the
standards which must be met in representation elections. A far better approach was
taken in NLRB v. Monroe Auto Equip. Co., 406 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1969), denying
enforcement to 164 N.L.R.B. 1051 (1967), where the court remanded a Board decision for
further hearings on allegations that the Board agent showed favoritism toward the union
and left the ballot box unattended. After these hearings were held, the court enforced
the Board's bargaining order. See 186 N.L.R.B. 90 (1970), enforced, 470 F.2d 1329 (5th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 928 (1973).
287. 634 F.2d 320 (6th Cir. 1980), enforcing 233 N.L.R.B. 56 (1977).
288. 634 F.2d at 322 & n.1. These affidavits were potentially crucial because they
could have helped the employer rehabilitate witnesses.
289. Id. at 324.
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fair procedure," it concluded that the record failed "to suggest any
2 90
prejudicial effect upon the fairness of the election."
This result is most unsatisfactory. As the court acknowledged, in
an earlier case it had remanded a Board decision based on the exact
same procedural error.2 9 ' Furthermore, it seems specious (or at
least premature) for the court to conclude that the election was not
unfair when the Board's hearing to determine that matter had been
demonstrably flawed by the refusal to let the employer examine the
affidavits. As Judge Merritt stated in dissent:
I cannot conclude that the Company was not prejudiced
when it was denied certain affidavits. The affidavits may contain unique evidence favorable to the Company. They may
not. We simply cannot tell, regardless of where the probabilities may lie. Nor is it reasonable for us to require the Company to prove the usefulness of the affidavits['] contents. This
smacks of Catch-22. If the Company knew what the contents
were, [it] would not need to ask for them. I do not believe our
Court should condone such heavy-handed action by the
2 92
Board.
Judge Merritt clearly had the better of this argument. Fotomat did
not involve a type of "harmless error" where the Board failed to
follow the precise wording of its internal guidelines. To the contrary, it involved both an initial failure to honor the employer's right
to prepare its case and a subsequent refusal to provide such documents to the Sixth Circuit so it could make a knowledgeable determination of that earlier failure's consequences. Not only is one left
with doubts concerning the election's fairness, one is also left with a
sense that the Board could freely ignore published regulations,
wrongfully deny a party its right to relevant documents, and cripple
a reviewing court's ability to evaluate the impact of its misconduct.
Rather than healthy deference toward administrative discretion,
Fotomat represents nothing less than judicial complicity in bureau2 93
cratic lawlessness.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 323-24 (stating: "In NLRB v. American [Federation]of Television and Radio

Artists, 285 F.2d 902 (6th Cir. 1961), where the trial examiner refused to require the
General Counsel to disclose pretrial statements of witnesses who testified at the hearing,
our court remanded the cause to the Board with instructions to correct the procedural
error.") No effort was made to distinguish American Federation or to reconcile it with the
case at bar.
292. Id. at 327 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
293. In its defense, the court argued that "[t]he Board's acknowledgement of error
largely dissipates any prophylactic effect upon the Board and is offset by the harm of
further frustrating the plainly expressed will of the employees who voted in the
election." Id. at 325. That purported justification crumbles, however, upon
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Fotomat starkly demonstrates how Athbro all too frequently has
been treated as a poetic statement of the ideal whose prescriptive
vision must give way to everyday realties. As such, it is symbolic of
the tension between idealism and outcome-determinism that
plagues the Board and courts whether they are addressing fraternization, the delegation of duties, behavior suggesting partisanship,
or other breakdowns and peculiarities in the Board's electoral procedures. In no area have the Board and courts reached a clear consensus on how best to address the problem of apparent Board agent
bias in representation elections, although a generation has now
passed since Athbro was decided.
V.

CONCLUSION

As I hope to have demonstrated, the Board and courts have been
unnervingly inconsistent in their responses toward allegations of
Board agent bias in representation elections. Although more than
twenty years have passed since Athbro was decided, the Board has
applied its standard in only a fitful manner. At times the Board rigorously has applied Athbro and invalidated elections regardless of
whether the alleged favoritism of a Board representative could have
affected the workers' votes. On many other occasions, however, the
Board has refused to set aside elections unless it appeared that an
agent's misconduct may have had an impact on the balloting's results. Adding to the confusion, the Board also has purported to apply
Athbro in cases where it really seemed to focus on whether the election's outcome could have been affected. As a result, it remains uncertain when and why elections will be invalidated due to the
appearance of Board partisanship. Furthermore, the circuit courts
frequently have exacerbated this indeterminacy by mirroring rather
than rectifying the Board's wavering on this point.
examination. First, the Board's admittance of its error in denying access to the affidavits
does not alleviate the plight of the party that was not permitted to use such documents
to prepare its case and does not assure that the Board will not repeat its mistake. If
anything, the court's opinion insulates such errors from reversal (and therefore fails to
deter them) by claiming that they are not material as long as the Board acknowledges
them. Such acknowledgements of error are trite unless the Board moves to correct
them in particular cases, and the courts should not permit administrative agencies to
indulge in a modern game of confession and avoidance. Second, that the Board

acknowledged its initial error in denying access to the employer in no way justifies its
later refusal to grant access to the court. Third, the court cannot conclude with
confidence that the vote did indeed reflect the employees' free choice when the hearing
to determine that very issue contained such a potentially prejudicial procedural error.
The court waves the banner of employee sovereignty without adequately examining-or

remanding so the Board must examine-whether that sovereignty was undermined by
the allegedly objectionable activity that the employer sought to prove.
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This indeterminacy takes its toll in several respects. First, it leaves
management, unions, workers, and even the Board's own field
agents dancing in the dark, for how can they evaluate whether laboratory conditions have been spoiled when even Board members and
judges have not spoken in a clear and consistent manner? It becomes difficult to appraise an election's validity with any certitude
29 4
when the Board and courts apply yardsticks that are ever-shifting.
This uncertainty begets conflict which begets litigation. Confronted with the incessant waffling of administrators and judges,
parties can be expected to appeal adverse decisions and urge tribunals to adopt whichever standard best suits their purposes. As long
as the Board and courts fail to adhere consistently to Athbro, parties
will often push litigation into appellate forums, increasing costs for
29 5
themselves and the government alike.

Perhaps even worse, this indeterminacy cripples the ability of the
Board and courts to convey a clear and persuasive normative vision
concerning the problem of possible Board agent partisanship. As
Professor Nesson asserts:
Our legal system reflects our collective aspirations, just as it
shapes our conduct through the projection of norms embodied in the substantive law. Our belief in the legitimacy of the
legal system is a function of the extent to which we feel it re-

294. The effects of this phenomenon extend to state labor cases as well as federal
litigation. See, e.g., George Arakelian Farms v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., 150 Cal.
App. 3d 664, 198 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1984), vacated, 40 Cal. 3d 654, 710 P.2d 288, 221 Cal.
Rptr. 488 (1985). The California Agricultural Labor Relations Board argued that "the
NLRB does use an outcome determinative test to evaluate allegations of board agent
misconduct. There are, in fact, two different strains of NLRB precedent on the subject,
and the Board's use of an outcome determinative test is supported by one of them."
Arakelian, 150 Cal. App. 3d at -, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 204 (emphasis omitted by the court).
295. As Judge Posner explains:
Settlement out of court is cheaper than litigation. So only if each
disputant expects to do better in the litigation than the other disputant
expects him to do are the parties likely to fail to agree on settlement
terms that make them both consider themselves better off compared with
how they anticipate faring in litigation. Uncertainty is a necessary
condition of such a divergence of estimates. It can be either factual or
legal but only legal uncertainty is relevant here. If it is great, there will be
much litigation, including much appellate litigation.
R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 511 (3d ed. 1986). Posner adds that "[b]ut
since litigation, especially at the appellate level, generates precedents, the upsurge in
litigation will lead to a reduction in legal uncertainty. Hence the amount of litigation
will fall in the next period." Id. Unfortunately, this subsequent reduction in litigation
cannot come to pass as long as the Board and appellate courts produce a plethora of
competing and conflicting "precedents" whose meaning, vitality, and persuasive power
are constantly subjected to questioning by the same or different tribunals.
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flects our values, and to a considerable extent our values are
influenced by the effect the legal system has upon us. 296
This dialectic is distorted, however, when the Board and courts
send conflicting and internally inconsistent messages regarding the
standards to be applied in cases of alleged bias. Such opinions
neither reflect a shared understanding of how to safeguard elections
nor guide us to an enlightened understanding of how best to approach and protect the elusive ideal of laboratory conditions. One
hesitates to regard such opinions as "legitimate," and therefore
worthy of respect, when they do little more than radiate on a larger
scale the same conflicting impulses emanating from the briefs of opposing parties. We are left with no readily discernible normative
vision, but only with a disconcerting array of result-oriented rhetoric
heading in diverse paths.
Perhaps this chronic infidelity to the Athbro standard is symptomatic of a congenital defect in the standard itself. One cannot deny,
for example, that Athbro's language is open-ended and may lend itself to differing interpretations. The directive that Board agent misconduct "which tends to destroy confidence" in the electoral
process or which "could reasonably be interpreted as impugning"
the Board's standards is a "sufficient" basis for requiring a new election is certainly not free from ambiguity. 297
One wonders, however, whether that language could be tailored
much more precisely and still cover the myriad forms of misconduct
Athbro was conceived to address. Athbro was never intended to provide a fail-safe formula for automatically determining an election's
validity. Instead, like any other standard, it can only attempt to lay
down a reasonably clear and useful guideline for the resolution of
future disputes. Hard cases will still exist, but Athbro adequately fulfills its purpose by emphasizing that the Board must safeguard its
aura of integrity and neutrality even if the workers' voting behavior
has not demonstrably been affected in a particular case.
Athbro's critics might also argue that it is perversely counterintuitive to invalidate elections simply because a Board agent has misbehaved. 298 That line of attack falters, however, once we remember
that an election's true legitimacy depends as much on people's perceptions as on whether particular votes have been influenced. To a

296. Nesson, supra note 109, at 1391.
297. Athbro Precision Eng'g Corp., 166 N.L.R.B. 966, 966 (1967).
298. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 402, 427 (giving examples of such criticisms).
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real extent, "thinking makes it so"299 and no election can be regarded as "valid" in a meaningful sense if its aftermath is marred by
reasonable doubts concerning its integrity. It is better to hold a new
election than to undermine the Board's appearance of impartiality
and leave all concerned with continuing doubts as to the election's
legitimacy.
A related criticism is that application of the Athbro standard leads
to delays and expense for all concerned. Moreover, there may be a
legitimate concern that parties will capitalize on trivial bureaucratic
missteps to antagonize opponents, overturn unfavorable election results, and (in the case of employers) postpone having to bargain
30 0
with a new union.
These problems are undeniable, but again they seem outweighed
by the need to preserve faith in the sanctity of representation elections. A worker's decision on whether or not to unionize may be the
most critical choice of her professional life. Not only will it affect
vital material issues such as her future wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment, it is also a primary act of selfexpression and collective self-determination. Given the centrality of
this choice to workers' material rewards and psychological identity,
it must not be corrupted by the fear that it merely reflects the effects
of a Board agent's partisanship.
Furthermore, the concern over costs may be mitigated (at least
partially) in other ways. The consistent application of Athbro would
lead most probably to a diminution in both Board agent misconduct
and in parties' eagerness to appeal the Board's conclusions: there
would be both a deterrence of acts suggesting bias and less reason
for parties to believe they could convince a tribunal not to follow
Athbro. This in itself should reduce the cost of vigorously protecting
the rights of workers and the Board's good name.
Furthermore, we could discourage parties from raising frivolous
allegations of bias by subjecting them to sanctions similar to those
under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 30 1 Any party
299.
Prince
so").
300.
301.

W. SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act II, sc. 2, lines 249-50 (Riverside ed. 1974) (stating
Hamlet's belief that "there is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it
See WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 402, 427.
As Rule II states in pertinent part:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the
signer that the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that
to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed
after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper
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that raises an allegation or defense in bad faith should be compelled
to pay its opponent's expenses in litigating the matter. And in cases
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation.... If a pleading, motion, or other paper
is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own
initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented
party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to
pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper,
including a reasonable attorney's fee.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
Rule 11 itself may not be applicable to Board proceedings. See, e.g., MJ. Santulli Mail
Servs., Inc., 281 N.L.R.B. 1288, 1290 (1986) (containing administrative law judge's assessment that Rule 11 and the other Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "are not applicable to administrative hearings"); Shrewsbury Motors, Inc., 281 N.L.R.B. 486, 491 (1986)
(stating administrative law judge's conclusion that "I am inclined to agree with the General Counsel that Rule 11 is not applicable to Board proceedings"). As the administrative law judge observed in Santulli, however, "[sjection 102.21 of the Board's Rules and
Regulations is very similar to Rule 11 ....
281 N.L.R.B. at 1290. 29 C.F.R. § 102.21
(1988) provides in pertinent part:
The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has
read the answer; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief
there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.
If an answer is not signed or is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of
this rule, it may be stricken as sham and false and the action may proceed
as though the answer had not been served. For a willful violation of this
rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action.
In practice, however, the Board appears reluctant to invoke sanctions pursuant to section 102.21. In Santulli, for example, the Board agreed that the employer had violated
this section but concluded:
As our attention has not been called to other instances where counsel for
the Respondent [employer] has engaged in similarly inappropriate conduct, in the circumstances of this case the Board will limit its disciplinary
action to expressing our strong disapproval of such conduct and cautioning counsel for the Respondent against similar conduct in future appearances before the Board.
281 N.L.R.B. at 1288 n.l.
In particularly egregious cases, however, the Board has relied on its broad remedial
powers to compel the guilty party to compensate its opponent and the Board. In Tiidee
Products, Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. 1234 (1972), enforced as modified, 502 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975), for example, the Board ruled:
[F]rivolous litigation such as this is clearly unwarranted and should be
kept from the nation's already crowded court dockets, as well as our own.
While we do not seek to foreclose access to the Board and courts for
meritorious cases, we likewise do not want to encourage frivolous proceedings. The policy of the Act to insure industrial peace through collective bargaining can only be effectuated when speedy access to uncrowded
Board and court dockets is available. Accordingly, in order to discourage
future frivolous litigation, to effectuate the policies of the Act, and to
serve the public interest we find that it would be just and proper to order
Respondent [the employer] to reimburse the Board and the Union for
their expenses in the investigation, preparation, presentation, and conduct of these cases, including the following costs and expenses incurred
in both the Board and court proceedings: reasonable counsel fees, sala-
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where the charges are well-founded, there is no reason why the innocent party should bear the cost of a second campaign. Parties
that knowingly participate in a Board agent's misdeed (e.g., as in
cases of fraternization), should be compelled to pay their opponents' reasonable litigation costs and campaign expenses. When
the Board appears to be the sole culprit, the government itself
should bear the costs of both the employer and the union.
In this manner, we could increase the deterrent effect of invalidating elections while easing the burden on parties that have done no
wrong. Board representatives would be deterred by the onus of
professional embarrassment and by the prospect that their agency
would have to compensate the wronged parties. Private parties
would also be deterred from inducing or participating in an agent's
misconduct by the fear that they too would be penalized for their
misconduct. Finally, parties would be deterred from raising frivolous objections by the prudent application of sanctions. This approach obviously would not eliminate all costs and delays, but it
would make their distribution more equitable and, one would hope,
30 2
reduce incidents of Board agent misconduct.
ries, witness fees, transcript and record costs, printing costs, travel expenses and per diem, and other reasonable costs and expenses.
194 N.L.R.B. at 1236.
Although Tiidee Products is a prominent example to the contrary, the Board has proved
reluctant to impose sanctions on guilty parties. See, e.g., American Thoro-Clean, Ltd,
283 N.L.R.B. 1120 (1987); Lang Towing, Inc., 201 N.L.R.B. 629 (1973); International
Union of Operating Eng'rs, 200 N.L.R.B. 593 (1972); United Steelworkers of America,
200 N.L.R.B. 40 (1972); Terri-Flex Prods., Inc., 200 N.L.R.B. 3 (1972); Marsal Transp.,

Inc., 199 N.L.R.B. 689 (1972). But cf DPM of Kan., Inc., 261 N.L.R.B. 220 (1982),
enforced, 744 F.2d 83 (10th Cir. 1984) (striking an employer's answer for violating
§ 102.21).
On the appellate level, Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure may be
invoked by the circuit courts to discourage frivolous appeals. As Rule 38 provides, "[i]f
a court of appeals shall determine that an appeal is frivolous, it may award just damages
and single or double costs to the appellee." This sanction has been imposed by courts
in a variety of labor cases. See, e.g., Sparks v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1987) (imposing sanctions for frivolous appeal of General Counsel's decision not to file an unfair
labor practice charge on behalf of a terminated employee); NLRB v. Cincinnati Bronze,
Inc., 829 F.2d 585 (6th Cir. 1987) (sanctioning employer for appeal from civil contempt
holding); NLRB v. Limestone Apparel Corp., 705 F.2d 799 (6th Cir. 1982) (permitting
union to recover double costs for employer's frivolous appeal of Board order), enforcing
255 N.L.R.B. 722 (1981).
Although none of the cases cited above concerned litigation stemming from an allegation of Board agent bias in a representation election, they demonstrate that the Board
and courts do have substantial discretion to fashion equitable remedies and to sanction
parties for bad faith litigation tactics.
302. For an insightful analysis of the effects of different systems of allocating litigation
expenses, see Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative
Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, I IJ. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1982).
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I believe, therefore, that the Athbro game is worth the candle. If
properly applied, the salutary effects of the Athbro standard should
overcome its undeniable ambiguities and expense. But even if Athbro were simply impractical, that would not justify how numerous
Board members and judges have deliberately ignored or misconstrued its meaning. Not since Judge Sirica in 1968303 has ajudge or
Board member explicitly attacked Athbro and its underlying premises. Rather, all too frequently tribunals have simply ignored this
precedent or misapplied it to limit its significance and power. Such
manipulation parasitically weakens Athbro without explicitly attempting to replace it with any alternative analysis of how to protect representation elections from the appearance of Board partisanship.
This is most unfortunate, for the stakes are high: in addition to
assuring that workers vote in a clean laboratory we must assure that
Board representatives maintain their integrity and neutrality, in appearance as well as in fact. This, of course, is part of a larger effort
to insist that government officials act within their proper bounds
and do not illegitimately infringe upon decisions explicitly left by
law to individual choice. As Gerald Frug asserts: "Bureaucracy is
the primary form of organized power in America today, and it is
therefore a primary target for those who seek liberation from modern forms of human domination. ' 30 4 On a small but important
level, we can further our struggle by preventing Board representatives from even inadvertently interfering with the right of workers to
embrace or reject particular unions.
I conclude, therefore, that the Board's and courts' frequent departure from the path blazed in Athbro is pernicious on both normative and practical grounds. Until and unless a convincing
demonstration is made to the contrary, the Board and federal courts
should move vigorously to nurture the Athbro standard and keep
faith with the workers' rightful expectations that their freedom of
choice shall remain unfettered.
303. For a discussion of International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v.
NLRB, 67 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2361 (D.D.C. 1968), see supra notes 61-72 and accompanying

text.
304. Frug, supra note 222, at 1295. Although I have strong disagreements with both
Frug's prescriptive and descriptive analyses of American bureaucracy, I applaud his

recognition of its power and the need to redress its antidemocratic tendencies.

